

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
WELLINGTON REGISTRY

AP 214/93

IN THE MATTER of the Resource
Management Act 1991

AND

IN THE MATTER of Appeals pursuant
to that Act from
Decision No W53/93, and
Decision ENF 210/92 of
the Planning Tribunal

BETWEEN COUNTDOWN PROPERTIES
(NORTHLANDS) LIMITED and
COUNTDOWN FOODMARKETS
NEW ZEALAND LIMITED

Appellant

AND THE DUNEDIN CITY COUNCIL

Respondent

AND M L INVESTMENT COMPANY
LIMITED and WOOLWORTHS
(NZ) LIMITED

Second Respondent

AP 215/93

IN THE MATTER of the Resource
Management Act 1991

AND

IN THE MATTER of An Appeal
thereunder from Decision
No W53/93 of the
Planning Tribunal

BETWEEN FOODSTUFFS
(OTAGO/SOUTHLAND)
PROPERTIES LIMITED

Appellant

AND THE DUNEDIN CITY COUNCIL
Respondent

AND M L INVESTMENT COMPANY
LIMITED and WOOLWORTHS
(NZ) LIMITED
Second Respondent

AP 216/93

IN THE MATTER of the Resource
Management Act 1991

AND

IN THE MATTER of An Appeals
pursuant to that Act
from Decision No W53/93
and Decision ENF 210/92
of the Planning Tribunal

BETWEEN TRANSIT NEW ZEALAND
Appellant

AND THE DUNEDIN CITY COUNCIL
Respondent

AND M L INVESTMENT COMPANY
LIMITED and WOOLWORTHS
(NZ) LIMITED
Second Respondent

Coram:

Barker J (presiding)
Williamson J
Fraser J

Hearing:

1,2,3,4,7,8 February 1994 (in
Christchurch)

Counsel:

R J Somerville and R J M Sim for
Foodstuffs
T C Gould and D G Bigio for
Woolworths
E D Wylie for Countdown
A J P More for Transit New Zealand
N S Marquet for Dunedin City
Council

Date of Judgment: 7 March 1994

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Introduction:

These appeals from a decision of the Planning Tribunal ('the Tribunal') given on 4 August 1993 have significance beyond their particular facts. They involve the first consideration by this Court of various provisions of the Resource Management Act 1991 ('the RMA') - a statute which made material alterations to the way in which land use and natural resources are managed. A number of statutes, notably the Town & Country Planning Act 1977 ('the TCPA') were repealed by the RMA and the regimes which they imposed were altered significantly, both in form and in substance. Although the RMA was amended extensively last year, counsel assured the Court that its decision is likely nevertheless to offer long-term guidance to local authorities and to professionals concerned with planning. Counsel were agreed that transitional provisions in the 1993 amendment required these appeals to be determined under the provisions of the 1991 Act without reference to the 1993 amendment.

All three appeals were heard together by a Court of three Judges which was assembled because of the importance of the issues raised and the need for guidance in the early

stages of the RMA's regime. At the commencement of the hearing, the Court was advised by counsel for the appellant, Transit NZ Limited ('Transit') that his client had reached a settlement with the first respondent, the Dunedin City Council ('the Council') and the second respondents, M L Investment Company Limited and Woolworths (NZ) Ltd, (called collectively 'Woolworths'). This settlement was on the basis that, if the other two appeals were substantially to fail, agreement had been reached on the appropriate rules for parking, access and traffic control which should be incorporated in the relevant section of the Council's District Plan.

Counsel for Transit was given leave to be absent for the bulk of the hearing but appeared for the hearing of submissions by the other appellants who claimed that the proposed settlement was incapable of implementation. Those other appellants were -

- (a) Countdown Properties (Northlands) Limited and Countdown Foodmarkets New Zealand Limited (collectively called 'Countdown'); and
- (b) Foodstuffs (Otago/Southland) Limited ('Foodstuffs').

Like most local bodies in New Zealand, the Dunedin City Council underwent major territorial changes in 1991 as a result of local body re-organisation. Instead of being just one of several territorial authorities in the

greater Dunedin region, the Council now exercises jurisdiction over a greatly enlarged area which includes all the former Dunedin municipalities plus areas of rural land formerly located in several counties. Allowing a certain straining of the imagination in the interests of municipal efficiency, the 'city', as now defined, penetrates into Central Otago, past Hyde, and up the northern coast, including within its boundaries a number of seaside townships such as Waikouaiti.

In consequence, the Council inherited a pot-pourri of District Schemes under the 1977 Act, some urban, some rural. These schemes became the Council's transitional district plan under the RMA. The task imposed by the RMA on the Council of preparing a comprehensive plan for this new and varied territorial district is a daunting one, particularly in view of the wide consultation required by the RMA. It was estimated at the hearing before the Tribunal that the section of the new district plan covering urban Dunedin will not be published until late 1994 at the earliest.

We note that the RMA has introduced a whole new vocabulary which has supplanted the well-known terms used by the TCPA. For example, "scheme" becomes "plan"; "ordinance" becomes "rule". Presumably, the drafters of the RMA wanted to emphasise that Act's new approach; it was not to be seen as a mere refurbishment of the TCPA.

One of the many ways in which the RMA differs from the TCPA, lies in the ability of persons other than public bodies, to request a Council to initiate changes to a district plan. The cost is met by the person proposing the plan change. Under the TCPA, only public authorities of various sorts could request a scheme change. The process by which this kind of request is made and implemented is an important feature of these appeals and will be discussed in some detail later.

Essentially, these appeals are concerned with a request by Woolworths to the Council, seeking a plan change to rezone a central city block from an existing Industrial B zone to a new Commercial F zone. On about 40% of the area of this block (which is bounded by Cumberland, Hanover, Castle and St Andrew Streets and has a total land area of some 2 hectares), stands a large building, formerly used as a printing works. Woolworths wishes to develop a "Big Fresh" supermarket within this building; all parking as well as the retail outlet would be under the one roof. Had Woolworths sought an ad hoc resource management consent under the RMA to use the land in this way (cf the 'specified departure' procedure under the TCPA) Countdown and Foodstuffs would not have been able to object. When a plan change is advertised, however, there is no limit to those who may object.

Both appellants operate supermarkets within the same general area in or near the Dunedin central business

district. They lodged submissions in opposition to the plan change with the Council and appeared at a hearing of submissions before a Committee of the Council.

Dissatisfied with the Council's decision in favour of the plan change, they initiated references to the Tribunal under clause 14 of the First Schedule to the RMA ('the First Schedule'). The concept of a 'reference' of a proposed plan change to the Tribunal instead of an appeal to the Tribunal is part of the new approach found in the RMA. The appellants subsequently appealed to this Court alleging errors of law in the Tribunal's decision. Appeal rights to this Court are governed by S.299 of the RMA but are similar in scope to those conferred by the TCPA.

Amongst numerous parties, other than Countdown and Foodstuffs, making submissions to the Council were two who subsequently sought references of the proposed plan change to the Tribunal; i.e. Transit and the NZ Fire Service. Transit's concern was with the efficiency of the State Highway network and with parking and access; two of the streets bounding the proposed new Commercial F zone constitute the north and southbound lanes respectively of State Highway 1. The Fire Service was concerned with the effect of the traffic generated by various vehicle-orientated retail outlets on the efficient egress of fire appliances from the nearby central fire station. NZ Fire Service did not appeal to this Court.

In addition to the references, there was a related application to the Tribunal by Countdown seeking the following declarations under S.311 of the RMA -

- (a) whether the Council could change its transitional district plan; and
- (b) whether the Council could lawfully complete the evaluation and assessments required by S.32 of the RMA subsequent to the public hearing of submissions on the plan change.

The first question was considered by Planning Judge Skelton sitting alone; on 1 February 1993, he determined that it was permissible for Woolworths to request the Council to change its transitional district plan at the request of Woolworths and to promote the change in the manner set out in the First Schedule. There was no appeal against that decision. The second question was subsumed with other matters raised in the references, and was left for argument in the course of the substantive hearing before the Tribunal.

That hearing before the Tribunal chaired by Principal Planning Judge Sheppard, lasted 16 sitting days; its reserved decision occupies some 130 pages. The decision is notable for its clarity and comprehensiveness; we have been greatly assisted in our consideration of the complex issues by the way in which the Tribunal has both

expressed its findings and discussed the statutory provisions which are at times difficult to interpret.

Because the decision of the Tribunal contains all the necessary detail, we do not need to repeat many matters of fact and history adequately summarised in that decision. Nor do we feel obliged to refer to all the Tribunal's reasons particularly where we agree with them. Aspects of the essential chronology need to be mentioned.

Chronology:

Woolworths' request, made pursuant to S.73(2) of the RMA, was received by the Council on 19 December 1991. In addition to asking for the change of zoning of the relevant land from Industrial to Commercial, Woolworths provided the Council with an environmental analysis of the request and some suggested rules for a new zone. On 20 January 1992, the Planning and Environmental Services Committee of the Council, acting under delegated authority, resolved to "agree to the request" in terms of Clause 24(a) of the First Schedule of the Act ('the First Schedule'). This resolution was made within 20 working days of receiving the request as required by Clause 24. The Council also resolved to delegate to the District Planner authority to prepare the plan change, undertake all necessary consultations and to request and commission all additional information as required by the RMA. There was consultation by the Council with Woolworths as

envisaged by the legislation, which requires private individuals seeking plan changes to underwrite the Council's expenses in undertaking the exercise.

Early in February 1992, the Council informed the owners of land in the block and some statutory authorities of the proposal. Public notice of the proposed plan change was given on 21 March 1992. It advised the purpose of the proposed change as "to provide for vehicle-orientated large scale commercial activity on the selected area of land on the fringe of the Central Business District." The proposed changes to policy statements and rules in the District Plan were opened to public inspection and submission.

Some 15 submissions on the plan change were received by the Council and a summary prepared. A further 66 notices of opposition or support were then generated; a public hearing was convened at which submissions were made by the parties involved in this present appeal plus many others who had either made submissions or who had supported or opposed the submissions of others. After the public hearing, a draft report purporting to address matters contained in S.32 of the RMA, was presented to the Council Planning Hearings Committee by a Mr K. Hovell, a consultant engaged by the Council to advise it on the proposed change. It was found by the Tribunal as fact, that the analysis required by S.32 (to be discussed in some detail later) was not prepared by the Council

until after the hearing of submissions. Obviously therefore, no draft S.32 report was available for comment at the public hearing of the submissions.

After the hearing of submissions, amendments were made by the Committee to a draft S.32 analysis prepared by Mr Hovell; a final version was prepared by him at the Committee's direction on 31 July 1992. The Tribunal found that Mr Hovell acted as a secretary and did not advise the Committee at this stage of its deliberations. On 11 August 1992, the Committee acting under delegated powers, decided that the change be approved. It had amended both the policy statements and the rules from those which had originally been advertised. The extent to which these amendments could or should have been made will be discussed later. All those who had made submissions were supplied with the Council's decision, a legal opinion from the Council's solicitors and a revised report from Mr Hovell headed "Section 32 Summary".

The extensive hearing before the Tribunal ensued as a result of the references made by the present appellants and NZ Fire Service. In broad terms, the effect of the Tribunal's decision was to direct the Council to modify the proposed plan change in a number of respects; however, it approved the change of zoning of the block in question from Industrial to Commercial.

Foodstuffs, Countdown and Transit exercised their limited right of appeal to this Court. A number of conferences with counsel and one defended hearing in Wellington refined the issues of law. Counsel co-operated so as to avoid unnecessary duplication of submissions. We record our gratitude to all counsel for their careful and full arguments.

Approach to Appeal:

We now deal with the various issues raised before us. Before doing so, we note that this Court will interfere with decisions of the Tribunal only if it considers that the Tribunal -

- (a) Applied a wrong legal test; or
- (b) Came to a conclusion without evidence or one to which on evidence, it could not reasonably have come; or
- (c) Took into account matters which it should not have taken into account; or
- (d) Failed to take into account matters which it should have taken into account.

See Manukau City v Trustees of Mangere Lawn Cemetery (1991), 15 NZTPA 58, 60.

Moreover, the Tribunal should be given some latitude in reaching findings of fact within its areas of expertise.

See Environmental Defence Society v Mangonui County Council (1988), 12 NZTPA 349, 353.

Any error of law must materially affect the result of the Tribunal's decision before this Court should grant relief. Royal Forest & Bird Protection Society Inc v W.A. Habgood Ltd (1987), 12 NZTPA 76, 81-2.

In dealing with reformist new legislation such as the RMA, we adopt the approach of Cooke, P in Northern Milk Vendors' Association Inc v Northern Milk Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 530, 537. The responsibility of the Courts, where problems have not been provided for especially in the Act, is to work out a practical interpretation appearing to accord best with the intention of Parliament.

In dealing with the individual grounds of appeal, we adhere to counsel's numbering. Some of the grounds became otiose when Transit withdrew from the hearing and one ground was dismissed at a preliminary hearing.

Grounds 1, 2 and 3:

1. The Tribunal misconstrued the provisions of S.32(1) when it held that the first respondent adopted the objectives, policies, and rules contained in Plan Change No 6 at the time when it made its decision that the plan change be approved in its revised form;
2. The Tribunal applied the wrong legal tests and misconstrued the Act when it concluded that the first respondent performed the various legal duties imposed on it by S.32;

3. The Tribunal misconstrued S.32 and S.39(10(a) of the Act and failed to apply the principles of natural justice by holding that the report of the first respondent's S.32 analysis did not need to be publicly disclosed before the first respondent held a hearing on proposed plan change 6.

These grounds are concerned with the Council's duty under S.32 of the RMA and can be dealt with together by a consideration of the following topics -

- (a) Was the Council correct in not fulfilling its duties under S.32(1) of the RMA before it publicly notified the plan change and called for submissions? Put in another way, was the Council right to carry out the S.32 analysis after the public hearing of submissions but before it published its decision?
- (b) Should the Council have made a S.32 report available to persons making submissions on the plan change?
- (c) Was the Council's actual S.32 report an adequate response to its statutory responsibility?
- (d) If the Council was in error in its timing of the S.32 report or in the adequacy of the report as eventually submitted, was the error cured by the extensive hearing before the Tribunal an independent judicial body before which all relevant matters were canvassed?

S.32 of the Act at material times read as follows

"32 Duties to consider alternatives, assess benefits and costs, etc - (1) In achieving the purpose of this Act, before adopting any objective, policy, rule or other method in relation to any function described in

subsection (2), any person described in that subsection shall -

- (a) Have regard to -
 - (i) the extent (if any) to which any such objective policy, rule, or other method is necessary in achieving the purpose of this Act; and
 - (ii) other means in addition to or in place of such objective, policy rule, or other method which, under this Act or any other enactment, may be used in achieving the purpose of this Act, including the provision of information, services, or incentives, and the levying of charges (including rates); and
 - (iii) the reasons for and against adopting the proposed objective, policy, rule, or other method and the principal alternative means available, or of taking no action where this Act does not require otherwise, and
 - (b) Carry out an evaluation, which that person is satisfied is appropriate to the circumstances, of the likely benefits and costs of the principal alternative means including, in the case of any rule or other method, the extent to which it is likely to be effective in achieving the objective or policy and the likely implementation and compliance costs; and
 - (c) Be satisfied that any such objective, policy, rule, or other method (or any combination thereof) -
 - (i) is necessary in achieving the purpose of this Act; and
 - (ii) is the most appropriate means of exercising the function, having regard to its efficiency and effectiveness relative to other means.
- (2) Subsection (1) applies to -
- (a) The Minister, in relation to -
 - (i) the recommendation of the issue, change, or revocation of any national policy statement under sections 52 and 53;
 - (ii) the recommendation of the making of any regulations under section 43.
 - (b) The Minister of Conservation, in relation to -
 - (i) the preparation and recommendation of New Zealand coastal policy statements under section 57'

- (ii) the approval of regional coastal plans in accordance with the First Schedule.
 - (c) Every local authority, in relation to the setting of objectives, policies, and rules under Part V.
- (3) No person shall challenge any objective, policy, or rule in any plan or proposed plan on the grounds that subsection (1) has not been complied with, except -
- (a) in a submission made under clause 6 of the First Schedule in respect of a proposed plan or change to a plan; or
 - (b) In an application or request to change a plan made under section 64(4) or section 65(4) or section 73(2) or clause 23 of the First Schedule."

Consideration must first be given to the method ordained by the RMA for implementing a plan change initiated by persons other than public bodies. S.73(2) provides -

"Any person may request a local authority to change its district plan and the plan may be changed in the manner set out in the First Schedule."

Clause 2 of the First Schedule requires -

"A written request to the local authority defining the proposed change with sufficient clarity for it to be readily understood and to describe the environmental results anticipated from the implementation of the change".

An applicant is not required to provide any other assessments or evaluations, although Woolworths did so.

Under clause 24 of the First Schedule, the local authority is required to consider the request for a plan change. Within 20 working days it must either "agree to the request" or "refuse to consider" it. The words

"agree to the request" are unfortunate; on one reading, the local authority might be seen as being required to assent to the plan change (i.e. agree to the request for a plan change) within 20 working days. We accept counsel's submissions that the only sensible meaning to be given to the phrase "agree to the request" is "agree to process or consider the request". This interpretation is consistent with the remainder of the First Schedule. The local authority may refuse to consider the request on one of the narrow grounds specified in clause 24(b) or defer preparation or notification on the grounds stated in clause 25. The Council's decision to refuse or defer a request for a plan change may be the subject of an appeal (not a 'reference') to the Tribunal (clause 26).

Clause 28 requires the local authority to prepare the change in consultation with the applicant and to notify the change publicly within 3 months of the decision to agree to the request; (copies of the request must be served on persons considered to be affected). 'Any person' is entitled to make submissions in writing; clause 6 details the matters which submissions should cover. In particular, a submitter must specify what it is he, she or it wants the Council to do. There is no statutory restriction on who can make a submission.

It is doubtful whether the local authority can make a submission to itself under the RMA in its original form.

The Court of Appeal in Wellington City Council v Cowie [1971] NZLR 1089 held that a local authority could not object to its own proposed scheme. The TCPA was changed to permit this. A similar provision was not found in the RMA; we were told by counsel that the 1993 amendment now permits the practice. In this case, the Council's development planner lodged a submission which the Tribunal found was lodged in his personal capacity.

The local authority must prepare a summary of all submissions and then advertise the summary seeking further submissions in support or opposition. The applicant for the plan change is entitled to receive a copy of all submissions and has a right to appear at the hearing as if the applicant had made a submission and had requested to be heard. The local authority must fix a hearing date, notifying all persons who made a submission and hold a public hearing; the procedure at the hearing is outlined in S.39 of the RMA; notably, no cross-examination is allowed.

After hearing all submissions, the local authority must give its decision "regarding the submissions" and state its reasons for accepting or rejecting the submissions. Any person who made a submission, dissatisfied with the decision of the local authority, has the right to seek a reference to the Tribunal.

As noted earlier, the words "refer" or "reference", refer to the way in which the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is invoked on plan changes by those unhappy with the Council's decision on the submissions. We shall discuss the Tribunal's powers on a reference later in this judgment. The Tribunal, after holding a hearing, can confirm the plan change or direct the local authority to modify, delete or insert any provision or direct that no further action be taken on the proposed change (clause 27 of the First Schedule). The Council may make amendments, of a minor updating and/or 'slip' variety before resolving to approve the plan change (as amended as a result of the hearing of submissions or any reference to the Tribunal).

The Act does not define the phrase used in S.32(1) "before adopting". The word "adopting" is not used in the First Schedule, which in reference to plan changes uses the words "proposed" (clause 21), "prepared" (clause 28), "publicly notified" (clause 5), "considered" (clauses 10 and 15), "amended" (clause 16), and "approved" (clauses 17 and 20). Section 32 also uses "to set" which implies a sense of finality.

Accepted dictionary meanings of the word "adopt" are "to take up from another and use as one's own" or "to make one's own (an idea, belief, custom etc) that belongs to or comes from someone else". The Tribunal held that the meaning of the word adopting is "the act of the

functionary accepting that the instrument being considered is worthy of the action that is appropriate to its nature".

The Tribunal's findings on the local authority's S.32 duties can be summarised thus.

(a) Read in the context of S.32(2) the word "adopting" as used in S.32(1) refers to the action of a local authority which, having heard and considered the submissions received in support of or in opposition to proposed objectives policies and rules, decides to change the measure from a proposal to an effective planning instrument.

(b) The duties imposed by S.32 are to be performed before adopting", that is, before the change is made into an effective planning instrument.

(c) All that the RMA requires is that the duties be performed at some time before the act of adoption.

(d) If Parliament had intended that in every case S.32 duties were to be performed before public notification of a proposed measure, and that people would have been entitled to make submissions about the performance of them, then there would have been words to express that intention directly.

(e) A separate document of the local authority's conclusions on the various matters raised in S.32(1) is not required to be prepared, let alone published for representations or comments, before the decision is made.

(f) In relation to change 6, the Council adopted the objectives, policies and rules of the change at the time when, having heard and deliberated on the submissions received, it made its decision that the planned change be approved in the revised form.

The essential argument for Foodstuffs and Countdown is that the Tribunal was wrong in law and that S.32 requires the Council to prepare the report before advertising the plan change or at the latest before the hearing of submissions regarding a plan change; it cannot fulfil its obligations under S.32 after that point.

Interpreting the provisions of S.32 of the RMA must commence with an examination of the words used in the section having regard not only to their context, but also to the purposes of the Act. S.32(2) describes the persons to whom the duties it imposes shall apply. They are the Minister for the Environment, the Minister of Conservation and every local authority.

So far as the Ministers are concerned, the description relates only to "recommendations" or the "preparation and recommendation" of policy statements or approvals. A

local authority is limited to "the setting" of objectives, policies and rules under Part V which applies to regional policy statements, regional plans and district plans. A distinction has thus been made in the section between Ministers and local authorities. In relation to Ministers, the section expressly refers to recommendation or preparation and recommendation whereas with local authorities, the section refers to the setting of objectives, policies and rules.

Under S.32(1) the local authority involved in the setting of objectives, policies and rules must complete certain duties before adopting such objectives, policies or rules. We see no reason to read the phrase "before adopting" other than in its plain and ordinary meaning. Adopting involves the local authority making an objective, policy or rule its own. The Appellants submitted that the phrase requires the duties to be carried out prior to public notification of change. They argued that the local authority adopts a privately requested change prior to public notification because it had, by then, set or settled the substance of the requested change.

We do not accept this submission because the procedure in Clauses 21 to 28 (inclusive) of the First Schedule does not envisage the local authority making the changes its own until after public notification, submissions, and decisions on submissions. It is inconsistent with that

procedure to conclude that the local authority adopted (or made its own) the proposed change prior to the decision on submissions.

A local authority's obligation under Clause 28 of the First Schedule is to prepare a requested change of plan in consultation with an applicant. The process relates to the form rather than the merits of the change. Even after public notification, the local authority has a discretion, on the application of an applicant, to convert the application to one for a resource consent rather than for a change to a plan (Clause 28(5)(a)). To decide that a local authority is adopting a requested change to an objective, policy or rule prior to its decision on submissions requires a conclusion which limits the meaning of "adopting" to encompassing prescribed procedural steps. No decision or positive act of will by the local authority would be required.

Lord Esher, MR in Kirkham v Attenborough, [1897] 1 QB 201, 203 held that, with a contract for sale of goods, there must be some act which showed that a transaction was adopted, an act which was consistent only with the person being a purchaser. In this case, there is no act of the Council which shows anything other than an initial acknowledgment that: (a) the proposed change has more than a little planning merit; and (b) a performance of prescribed duties to invest the proposed plan change with a form whereby its merits can be assessed by the public

submission process. There can be no act or decision, inconsistent with the performance of the obligations of the local authority until it has reached its decision upon the submissions.

During argument, two obstacles to this view were signposted. They concerned, first, S.32(3) and, second, S.19. It was submitted that S.32(3) clearly indicated that "before adopting" must mean "prior to public notification"; otherwise, the public would not have the right to challenge an objective policy or rule on the grounds of non-compliance with S.32. This conclusion followed, it was argued, from the necessity for the challenge to be in a submission under Clause 6 in respect to a proposed plan or change to a plan.

The Tribunal accepted that S.32(3) was capable of giving that indication but concluded that, if Parliament had intended the S.32 duties to be performed before public notification, then there would have been express words to that effect.

The first point to consider is whether S.32(3) applies to a privately requested plan change. In the definition section of the RMA, "proposed plan" means "a proposed plan or change to a plan that has been notified under clause 5 of the First Schedule but has not become operative in terms of clause 20 of the First Schedule; but does not include a proposed plan or change originally

requested by a person other than the local authority or a Minister of the Crown".

The Tribunal held: (a) there was no exclusion of privately requested changes in the words "change to a plan" in S.32(3)(a); (b) the use of the term "proposed plan" in the first phrase of S.32(3) does not preclude a challenge to the Council's performance of its S.32 duties in a submission under clause 16 of the First Schedule.

With respect we do not agree. There is no reason to read down the second part of the definition of "proposed plan" which clearly indicates that the definition of proposed plan does not apply to privately requested plan changes; accordingly, there can be no restriction as to the time when persons making submissions on a privately requested plan change may raise non-compliance with S.32 by the Council. They do not have to do so in their submission.

This approach to S.32(3) supports our view on the timing of the "adopting" of the plan change by the local authority. The Tribunal held, in this case, that the plan was not 'adopted' for the purposes of S.32 until it had heard and considered the submissions on the plan change. It was enough for it to provide the S.32 report at the time when it gave its decision on the submissions which it had heard and considered.

We agree with the Tribunal's decision in the result, although differing on the interpretation of S.32(3). We hold that the "adopting" by the local authority under S.32(1) takes place at a different time with a privately requested plan change than it does when the plan change is initiated by the local authority itself or at the request of another local authority or a Minister. This view follows from our interpretation of S.32(3). A person making a submission on a plan change instituted by a Minister or local authority can challenge the sufficiency of the S.32 report only in his or her submission on the plan change. We give this interpretation in the hope this important Act will prove workable for those who must administer it but at the same time, preserve the rights of persons affected by a plan change.

When a private individual requests a scheme change, the local authority's options are fairly limited. It can only reject the application out of hand if a plan change is 3 months away or if the request is frivolous, vexatious or shows little or no planning merit or is unclear or inconsistent or affects a policy statement or plan which has been operative for less than two years. At the stage of the initial request, the local authority could not possibly have carried out a potentially onerous S.32 investigation. It may not have time to do so even within the 3 months required under clause 28 of the First Schedule before notifying publicly the plan change.

Whilst a privately-inspired plan change may pass the threshold test, as the investigative process unrolls, the local authority may come to the view that the requested change is not a good idea; it may wish to await the hearing and consideration of the submissions before deciding whether to 'adopt' it. It will have to consider the wider implications of a proposed plan change during a period limited by clause 28 to 3 months. These considerations would often be canvassed at the hearing of submissions, as they were in this case, without a S.32 report being prepared. A local authority might not be therefore in a position to 'adopt' the plan change until it had the S.32 report; it could need the public hearing and consideration of submissions to flesh out that report to its own satisfaction.

In response to the argument that those making submissions should have access to a S.32 report because the Act in S.32(3) clearly envisages their having the right to comment on a S.32 report, the answer lies in the interpretation we have given to S.32(3). There is no restriction on the time in which a S.32 report can be challenged on a privately requested plan change; therefore, persons wishing to refer the Council's decisions or submissions to the Tribunal can criticise the S.32 report by means of a reference to the Tribunal.

However, the situation is different for those plan changes to which S.32(3) applies; i.e. plan changes

initiated by the local authority itself or requested by a regional authority or another territorial authority or by a Minister. In those situations, the S.32 report would have to be available at the time the plan change is advertised because of the limitation contained in S.32(3) on the right to comment on the adequacy or otherwise of a S.32 report. For scheme changes requested by a Minister or a local authority, such comment may only be made in a submission on the plan change.

It is no answer to say that a person making a submission in advance of knowing the contents of a S.32 report should include as a precaution a statement that the S.32 report was inadequate; this was suggested in argument by counsel for the Council. Such a course would make a mockery of the process and would imply little cause for confidence in the competence of the local authority.

In this scenario, the difference between 'adopt' and 'approval' is quite wide. The approval, which is the act of making a formal resolution about and affixing the seal to the text of the change may never happen; the result of the submissions to the Council or of a Tribunal direction on a reference may cause the local authority to find that its 'adopting' of the change was erroneous. However, with the plan change initiated privately, adopting comes at the time when the Council decides after hearing all the submissions that it should adopt the

change. Formal approval may follow later, depending on whether there are references to the Tribunal.

When the local authority itself initiates the plan change, the situation is simple; it should not do so unless it is then in a position to 'adopt' a plan change.

In the case of a plan change requested by another authority or by the Minister to which S.32(3) applies, a Council receiving the request will have to 'adopt' the change prior to advertising the change and therefore complete its S.32 report by that stage. Again, the Council may not ultimately 'approve' the change because it may come to a different view on the wisdom of doing so after hearing the submissions or after a Tribunal direction.

As to the argument that time is needed for a S.32 report, one imagines that other local authorities or a Minister in requesting the change should be in a position to supply the territorial authority with most of the information needed for its S.32 evaluation of the proposal. If there were not time available within the 3 months, then there is power for the local authority under S.38(2) to increase the time to a maximum of double. One would not envisage, however, a regional council or a Minister requesting a change without providing sufficient prima facie information justifying the request which would make the adopting process simple.

The time for 'adopting' the plan change therefore in terms of S.32, is a 'moveable feast' depending on whether or not the plan change is initiated by a private individual.

S. 19 of the RMA is as follows -

"19. Change to plans which will allow activities -
Where -

- (a) A new rule, or a change to a rule, has been publicly notified and will allow an activity that would otherwise not be allowed unless a resource consent was obtained; and
- (b) The time for making or lodging submissions or appeals against the new rule or change was expired and -
 - (i) No such submissions or appeal have been made or lodged; or
 - (ii) All such submissions have been withdrawn and all such appeals have been withdrawn or dismissed -

then, notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the activity may be undertaken in accordance with the new rule or change as if the new rule or change had become operative and the previous rule were inoperative."

This section allows activities to be undertaken in accordance with a new rule as if it had become operative, provided that the new rule has been publicly notified and the time for making submissions or appeals against the new rule has expired and no submissions or appeals have been made. The appellants argued that this section implies that consideration under S.32 must take place before the time for making or lodging submissions or

appeals against the new rule have expired; otherwise, activity could be undertaken which was contrary to S.32.

The Tribunal did not place any weight on the argument under S.19. We have carefully considered the submissions and conclude that, while S.19 may appear to produce the possibility of an anomalous situation, it does not affect the powers of a local authority in setting objectives, policies or rules. In particular, it does not reflect upon the time at which the local authority adopts such an objective, policy or rule. Section 19 is concerned with activities which may be undertaken. It is not concerned, as S.32 is, with the rule-making process. Even if a person takes the risk of commencing activity before approval of a change, that activity does not affect the policy, objective or rule itself. Whatever the position about such activity, a local authority is still required to be satisfied of the matters arising under S.32(1)(a), (b) and (c). Certainly there are no words within S.19 which purport to affect the duty under S.32.

Our general approach is supported, we think, by the difference between officially promoted and privately requested changes in their interim effect. S.9(1) of the RMA provides as follows-

"No person may use any land in a manner that contravenes a rule in a district plan or proposed district plan unless the activity is -

- (a) Expressly allowed by a resource consent granted by the territorial authority responsible for the plan; or
- (b) An existing use allowed by S.10 (certain existing uses protected).
..."

As noted, 'proposed district plan' includes a proposed change initiated by a local authority or Minister but not a privately requested change. Consequently an officially promoted plan has general planning effect from the date of public notification, whereas a privately requested plan has no general planning effect until approval. S.19 bears to some extent on the question of effect before approval but it is limited to activities allowed by the new rule where there is no opposition to it; in our opinion, as previously discussed, it does not support the appellants' case.

In the result, we believe that the Tribunal came to the correct decision about the timing of the S.32 report; in the circumstances of this case, the report was properly 'adopted' at the time when the Council gave its decision on the submissions.

In Ground 3 of the appeal it was argued that the principles of natural justice required persons making submissions to a local authority to have a S.32 report available to them prior to the hearing of submissions. Reference was made to S.39(1)(a) of the RMA requiring an appropriate and fair procedure at a hearing.

We did not consider that there is any merit in this submission. S.39 requires a public hearing with appropriate and fair procedures. Such a hearing took place on this occasion. There was no report or analysis under S.32 available since the local authority had been under no duty to carry it out prior to that time. The applicant and those making submissions were able to call evidence. When the report did come into existence, it was circulated to the parties. Later, during the reference to the Tribunal, there was ample opportunity to criticise the content of the report and to make submissions and call evidence concerning all aspects of it. We reject Ground 3.

The adequacy of the report prepared by the First Respondent is challenged in Ground 2. It was claimed that the Council (a) had taken into account irrelevant considerations, namely, Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the RMA; (b) had failed to take into account the matters; and had (c) applied the wrong test.

These same criticisms were considered by the Tribunal which concluded that, while the Council's S.32 analysis report did not scrupulously follow the language of S.32(1), it was not substantially deficient in any respect. After weighing the appellant's detailed criticisms, we are of the view that the Tribunal was correct in the robust and practical view that it took. It was suggested in submissions that the Tribunal

incorrectly permitted an inadequate compliance by the Council with its S.32 duties upon the basis that local authorities were still learning the extent of their responsibilities under the Act. We do not share that view. We note that the Tribunal stated -

"In our opinion failures to perform the S.32 duties in substance which are material to the outcome should not be excused. However deficiencies of form that are not material to the outcome, may properly be tolerated, at least in the introductory period when functionaries are still learning the extent of their responsibilities under the Act."

Earlier it stated -

"Although functionaries are not to be encouraged in expecting that failure to comply with duties imposed by S.32 can be condoned compliance needs to be considered in terms of a reasonable comparison of the material substance of what is done with what is required if any deficiency that may be discovered from a punctilious scrutiny of a S.32 assessment results in a requirement to return to the starting point as in some board games, the Act will not provide a practical process of resource management addressing substance not form."

We agree with those views.

Since our conclusions are that the Tribunal was not in error in relation to either the timing of the S.32 exercise or the adequacy of the First Respondent's S.32 analysis, there is no need to consider in depth the matter raised in the fourth question under this heading.

It is sufficient to note that the references to the Tribunal took place by way of a complete re-hearing. Any defect of substance in the Council's decision and

S.32 analysis was capable of exploration and resolution by the Tribunal. Even if there had been an error, we believe that it would have been corrected by the detailed, careful and extensive hearing by the Tribunal over a period of 16 days when detailed evidence was given by 19 witnesses and thorough submissions made by experienced Counsel. We are conscious of the approach described in Calvin v Carr, (1980) AC 574, A J Burr Limited v Blenheim Borough, [1982] NZLR 1 and Love v Porirua City Council, [1984] 2 NZLR 308.

We consider that this was one of those instances where any defects at the Council stage of hearing were cured by the thorough and professional hearing accorded to all parties by the Tribunal. Accordingly, grounds of appeal 1, 2 and 3 are dismissed.

Ground 4. "That the Tribunal applied the wrong legal tests and misconstrued the Act when it held that the first respondent did not exceed its lawful authority in making the amendments to the proposed plan change that were incorporated in the revised version of the change appended to its decision."

A revised and expanded version of the plan change as advertised emerged when the Council's decision was issued after hearing submissions. The appellants submitted that because many of the changes had not been specifically sought in the submissions lodged with and notified by the Council, that the Council's action in making many of the changes was ultra vires. Mr Wylie for Countdown presented detailed submissions comparing

relevant segments of the change as advertised with the counterparts in the Council's finished product.

Mr Marquet for the Council helpfully provided a compilation which, in each case, demonstrated: (a) the provision as advertised; (b) the provision in the form settled by the Council after the hearing of submissions; (c) the appellants' criticism of the alteration or addition; (d) (where applicable) the submission on which the alteration or addition was said by the Tribunal to have been based; (e) the Tribunal's decision in respect of each alteration or addition; and (f) other relevant references. We have found this compilation extremely helpful; we do not think it necessary to embark on the same detailed analysis of Counsel's submissions which occupied some 20 pages of the Tribunal's judgment, because we agree generally with the Tribunal's approach and its decision in respect of each individual challenge.

The Tribunal categorised the challenged variants into five groups: (a) Those sought in written submissions; (b) Those that corresponded to grounds stated in submissions; (c) Those that addressed cases presented at the hearing of submissions; (d) Amendments to wording not altering meaning or fact; (e) Other amendments not in groups (a) to (d).

Clause 6 of the First Schedule refers to the making of submissions in writing on any proposed plan change. A

person making a submission is required by clause 6 to state whether he/she wishes to be heard in respect of the submissions and to state the decision which the person wishes the local authority to make. A prescribed form requires the statement of grounds for the submission.

A summary of the submissions is advertised by the Council under clause 7(a) and submissions for or against existing submissions are then called for by way of public advertisement. A summary of submissions can only be just that; persons interested in the content of submissions are entitled to inspect the text of the submissions at the Council offices so that an informed decision on whether to support or object can be made. In this case, criticism was made of the adequacy of the summary but we see no merit in such a contention.

Many of the submissions did not specify the detailed relief or result sought. Many (such as Countdown's) pointed up deficiencies or omissions in the proposed plan. These alleged deficiencies or omissions were found in the body of the submissions. Countdown sought no relief other than rejection of the plan change. The Council in its decision accepted many of the criticisms made by Countdown and others and reflected these criticisms in the amendments found in the decision.

Clause 10 of the First Schedule states that, after hearing the submissions "the local authority concerned

shall give its decision regarding the submissions and state its reasons for accepting or rejecting them".

This is to be compared with Regulation 31 of the Town and Country Planning Regulations 1978 which stated that "the Council shall allow or disallow each objection either wholly or in part..." (Emphasis added)

Counsel for the appellants submitted that clause 10 was narrower in its scope than the TCP Regulations and did not permit the Council to do other than accept or reject a submission.

Like the Tribunal, we cannot accept this submission. We agree with the Tribunal that the word "regarding" conveys no restriction on the kind of decision that could be given. We accept the Tribunal's remark that "in our experience a great variety of possible submissions would make it impracticable to confine a Council to either accepting a submission in its entirety or rejecting it".

Councils customarily face multiple submissions, often conflicting, often prepared by persons without professional help. We agree with the Tribunal that Councils need scope to deal with the realities of the situation. To take a legalistic view that a Council can only accept or reject the relief sought in any given submission is unreal. As was the case here, many submissions traversed a wide variety of topics; many of

these topics were addressed at the hearing and all fell for consideration by the Council in its decision.

Counsel relied on Meade v Wellington City Council (1978), 6 NZTPA 400 and Morrow v Tauranga City Council (A.6/80 Planning Tribunal, 13 December 1979) which emphasised that a Council's role under a scheme change was to allow or disallow an objection.

The Tribunal held that a test formulated by Holland J in Nelson Pine Forest Limited v Waimea County Council (1988), 13 NZTPA 69, 73 applied. In that case the Tribunal on appeal had added conditions to ordinances which made certain uses "conditional uses". The Tribunal had dismissed the appellant's appeal from the Council scheme change whereby the logging of native forests on private land became a conditional rather than a predominant use. The Judge held that this extension of ordinances articulating conditions for the conditional use, was within the jurisdiction of the Council and accordingly of the Tribunal, although no objector had expressly sought it. He said -

"...that an informed and reasonable owner of land on which there was native forest should have appreciated that, if NFAC's objection was allowed and the logging or clearing of any areas of native forest became a conditional use, then either conditions would need to be introduced into the ordinance relating to conditional use applications, or at some stage or other the Council would adopt a practice of requiring certain information to be supplied prior to considering such applications. Had the Council adopted the conditions to the ordinances that it presented to the Tribunal at the

time of the hearing of the objection, I am quite satisfied that no one could reasonably have been heard to complain that they had been prejudiced by lack of notice. Such a decision would accordingly have been lawful."

The Tribunal noted and applied this test in Noel Leeming Limited v North Shore City (No 2), (1993), 2 NZRMA 243, 249.

Counsel for Countdown submitted that Holland J's observations were obiter and made in the context of the TCPA rather than of clauses 10 and 16 of the First Schedule. Counsel contended that Holland J's decision meant no more than that the Judge would have been prepared to find that the amendments ultimately made would have been within the parameters of and (by implication envisaged by) the objection as lodged.

There is some force in this submission. Indeed, a close reading of the decision in the Nelson Pine Forest v Waimea County case, the Tribunal's decision in Noel Leeming v North Shore City (No 2) and the Tribunal's decision in this case confirms that the paramount test applied was whether or not the amendments are ones which are raised by and within the ambit of the submissions. Holland J's reference to what an informed and reasonable owner of land should have appreciated was included within the context of his previous statement (p.73) -

"...it is important to observe that the whole scheme of the Act contemplates notice before changes are made by a local authority to the scheme statement and ordinances in its plan. It follows that when an

authority is considering objections to its plan or a review of its plan it should not amend the provisions of the plan or the review beyond what is specifically raised in the objections to the plan which have been previously advertised."

The same point was made by the Tribunal in Noel Leeming v Northshore City (No 2) at p.249 and the Tribunal in this case at p.59 of the decision.

Adopting the standpoint of the informed and reasonable owner is only one test of deciding whether the amendment lies fairly and reasonably within the submissions filed. In our view, it would neither be correct nor helpful to elevate the "reasonable appreciation" test to an independent or isolated test. The local authority or Tribunal must consider whether any amendment made to the plan change as notified goes beyond what is reasonably and fairly raised in submissions on the plan change. In effect, that is what the Tribunal did on this occasion. It will usually be a question of degree to be judged by the terms of the proposed change and of the content of the submissions.

The danger of substituting a test which relies solely upon the Court endeavouring to ascertain the mind or appreciation of a hypothetical person is illustrated by the argument recorded in a decision of the Tribunal in Meadow Mushrooms Ltd v Selwyn District Council & Canterbury Regional Council (C.A.71/93, 1 October 1993). The Tribunal was asked to decide whether it was either "plausible" or "certain" that a person would have

appreciated the ambit of submissions and consequently the need to lodge a submission in support or opposition. We believe such articulations are unhelpful and that the local authority or Tribunal must make a decision based upon its own view of the extent of the submissions and whether the amendments come fairly and reasonably within them.

The view propounded by the appellants is unreal in practical terms. Persons making submissions in many instances are unlikely to fill in the forms exactly as required by the First Schedule and the Regulations, even when the forms are provided to them by the local authority. The Act encourages public participation in the resource management process; the ways whereby citizens participate in that process should not be bound by formality.

In the present case, we find it difficult to see how anyone was prejudiced by the alterations in the Council's finished version. The appellants did not (nor could they) assert that they had not received a fair hearing from either the Council or the Tribunal. They expressed a touching concern that a wider public had been disadvantaged by the unheralded additions to the plan. We find it difficult to see exactly who could have been affected significantly other than those 81 who made submissions to the Council. More importantly, it is hard to envisage that any person who had not participated

in the Council hearing and the Tribunal hearing could have offered any fresh insight into the wisdom of the proposed plan change. We make this observation considering the exhaustive scrutiny given to the proposal by a range of professionals.

We have considered the detailed arguments addressed to us concerning each of the changes in the policy statement and rules. On the whole we agree with the classifications of the Tribunal into the categories which it created itself. Mr Marquet pointed out a few instances where the Tribunal may have wrongly categorised a particular variation. Even if he were correct, that does not alter our overall view. We broadly agree with the Tribunal's assessment of each variation, many of which were cosmetic.

There is only one variation which requires specific mention. That is the change to Rule 4. After the hearing of objections, the Council added a Rule to the effect that "any activity not specified in the preceding rules or permitted by the Act is not permitted within the zone unless consent is obtained by way of resource consent".

We find that there was no submission which could have justified that insertion. Nor is the fact that the omission may have been mentioned in evidence appropriate;

because the jurisdiction to amend must have some foundation in the submissions.

We do not see this omission as fatal. The Tribunal held, correctly, that there is power to excise offending variations without imperilling the scheme change as a whole. If Rule 4 can be excised, then S.373(3) of the RMA would apply; that subsection provides as follows -

"Where a plan is deemed to be constituted under subsection (1), or where a proposed plan or change is deemed to be constituted under subsection (2), the plan shall be deemed to include a rule to the effect that every activity not specifically referred to in the plan is a non-complying activity."

We say generally that no-one seems to have been disadvantaged by the amendments. Even where the relationship to the submissions was somewhat tenuous, it seems quite clear that at the extensive hearing before the Council, most of the matters were discussed. If they were not discussed before the Council, they were certainly discussed before the Tribunal at great length.

In fact the whole of the appellant's case can hardly be based on any lack of due process. Their objections to the plan were considered at great length and fairness by the Tribunal. Any complaints now (such as those under this ground) are of the most technical nature. We see nothing in this ground of appeal which is also rejected.

Ground 5. "The Tribunal erred in law when it determined the status of the written submission on plan change No. 6 made by an employee of the first respondent Mr J. Chandra, and its decision thereon was so unreasonable that no reasonable Tribunal properly directing itself in law and considering the evidence could have reached such a decision."

This ground was struck out by Barker ACJ at a preliminary hearing.

Ground 6. "The Tribunal applied the wrong legal test and misconstrued the Act when it declined to defer a decision on the merits of proposed plan change No 6 pending review by the first respondent of its transitional district plan.

Ground 7. The Tribunal misdirected itself when it determined that the Act restricts the authority of a territorial authority to decline to approve a plan change where it raises issues that have implications beyond the area encompassed by the plan change and which, in the instant case, should more appropriately be dealt with at a review of the transitional district plan.

Although these two grounds relate to discrete findings by the Tribunal, they cover similar ground and will be considered together. The appellants claimed that significant resource management issues involving the whole Dunedin City area arise when a Council is addressing a plan change involving only part of the district; consequently, any change to the district plan must have implications for other parts of the district. The appellants asserted that the Tribunal should have referred the proposed plan change back to the Council with the direction that it should be cancelled because the forthcoming review of the whole district plan was a more appropriate way of managing the resource management issues involved.

The Tribunal heard evidence from witnesses giving reasons why it was preferable to pursue integrated management for all parts of the district and that the best time to do that was at the time of the review. The Tribunal rejected this evidence. Its decision is succinctly stated thus -

"Although we accept that issues raised by plan change 6 would have implications for a wider area than the subject block, these proceedings are not inappropriate for addressing those issues. The proposed plan change was publicly notified; a number of submissions were received, and they were publicly notified; further submissions were received; the respondent's committee held a public hearing at which evidence was given; it made a full decision which was given to the parties; five parties exercised their rights to refer the change to the Tribunal; the Tribunal conducted a three week hearing in public at which public and private interests were represented, evidence was given by 19 witnesses, and full submissions were made. No one could be prejudiced by the Tribunal making decisions on matters in issue in the proceedings on the merits. On the contrary, the applicants would be prejudiced, and would be deprived of what they were entitled to expect, if the Tribunal were to withhold decisions on the merits on questions properly at issue before it. If we have a discretion in the matter, we decline to exercise it for those reasons."

The Tribunal went on to point out that clause 25 of the First Schedule provides that a local authority may defer preparation or notification of a privately requested change only where a plan review is due within 3 months; the review was due to be publicly notified at the end of 1994 at the earliest; it was not likely to be operative before 1997. The Tribunal further held that this was not the unusual case where a change should be deferred

and that the express provision for deferment in the First Schedule shows an intent by the Legislature that deferment is not intended for reviews that are more remote.

We entirely agree with the approach of the Tribunal. Clearly, the legislature was indicating that plan changes which had more than minimal planning worth should be considered on their merits, even although sponsored by private individuals, unless they were sought within a limited period before a review. We see no reason to differ from the view of the experienced Tribunal. This ground of appeal is also rejected.

Ground 8. "The Tribunal wrongly construed the ambit of the first respondent's lawful functions under Part V of the Act and in particular, misconstrued Ss.5(2), 9, 31(a), 31(b) and 76 by allowing the first respondent to direct and control the use and development of natural and physical resources within the subject block.

Under this ground, the appellants mounted a challenge to the way in which the Council used zoning in the proposed plan change. The appellants acknowledged that zoning was an appropriate resource management technique under the RMA. They did not accept that the RMA provides for zoning to restrict activities according to type or category unless it can be shown that the effects associated with a particular category breach "effects-based" standards. According to this argument, if any use is able to meet the environmental standards relating

to that zone, it is not lawful for rules under a plan to prevent any such use on the basis of type or description.

Counsel submitted that the plan change should have created a framework intended to enable people in communities to provide for their own social, economic and cultural wellbeing (the words of S.5 of the RMA). Much was made of the difference between the RMA and the TCPA. S.5 was said to be either or both 'anthropocentric' and 'ecocentric'.

Consideration of S.76 is required -

"S.76.

- (1) A territorial authority may, for the purpose of -
 - (a) Carrying out its functions under this Act; and
 - (b) Achieving the objectives and policies of the plan, - include in its district plan rules which prohibit, regulate, or allow activities.
- (2) Every such rule shall have the force and effect of a regulation in force under this Act but, to the extent that any such rule is inconsistent with any such regulation, the regulation shall prevail.
- (3) In making a rule, the territorial authority shall have regard to the actual or potential effect on the environment of activities including, in particular, any adverse effect; and rules may accordingly specify permitted activities, controlled activities, discretionary activities, non-complying activities, and prohibited activities.
- (4) A rule may -
 - (a) Apply throughout a district or a part of a district;
 - (b) Make different provision for -
 - (i) Different parts of the district; or
 - (ii) Different classes of effects arising from an activity:

- (c) Apply all the time or for stated periods or seasons;
- (d) Be specific or general in its application;
- (e) Require a resource consent to be obtained for any activity not specifically referred to in the plan."

The Tribunal considered that the plan change represented a reasonable and practical accommodation of the new plan with the old scheme which was acceptable for the remainder of the life of the transitional plan. It rejected the various contentions that the change was inconsistent with the transitional district plan and saw no legal obstacle to approval of the change. It characterised the Council's method of managing possible effects by requiring resource consent as a "rather unsophisticated response" to the new philosophies of the RMA but it held the response was only a temporary expedient, capable of being responsive in the circumstances.

We think that the Tribunal's approach was entirely correct. S.76(3) enables a local authority to provide for permitted activities, controlled activities, discretionary activities, non-complying activities and prohibited activities. The scheme change has done exactly this.

Similar submissions about S.5, the new philosophies of the RMA and the need to abandon the mindset of TCPA procedures were given to the Full Court in Batchelor v Tauranga District Council (No 2) [1992] 2 NZLR 84; that

was an appeal against a refusal by the Tribunal to grant consent to a non-complying activity. The Court said at

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"Our conclusion on the competing submissions about the application of S.5 to this case is that the section does not in general disclose a preference for or against zoning as such; or a preference for or against councils making provision for people; or a preference for or against allowing people to make provision for themselves. Depending on the circumstances, any measures of those kinds may be capable of serving the purpose of promoting sustainable management of natural and physical resources."

As in Batchelor's case, reference was made in the appellants' submissions to the speech in Hansard of the Minister in charge introducing the RMA as a bill. We find no occasion here to resort to our rather limited ability to use statements in parliamentary debates in aid of statutory interpretation. Wellington International Airport Ltd v Air New Zealand Ltd, [1993] 1 NZLR 671, 675 sets limits for resort to such debates.

To similar effect to Batchelor's case is a decision of Thorp J in K.B. Furniture Ltd v Tauranga District Council [1993] 3 NZLR 197. He too noted that the aims and objects of the RMA represent a major change in policy in that the RMA moved away from the concept of protection and control of development towards a more permissive system of management of resource focused on control and the adverse effects of activities on the environment.

We find the Batchelor and K.B. Furniture cases of great relevance when considering this ground of appeal; they looked at the underlying philosophy between the two Acts and, in particular, the application of S.5 of the RMA. In Batchelor's case, the Tribunal had taken a similar pragmatic view to that taken by the Tribunal in this case. The Full Court held that there was no general error in an approach which recognised the difficulty of operating with a transitional plan, conceived as a scheme under the TCPA, yet deemed to be a plan under the RMA. Zoning is a method of resource management, albeit a rather blunt instrument in an RMA context; under a transitional plan, activities may still be regulated by that means.

In the K.B. Furniture case, Thorp J characterised Batchelor's case as pointing to -

"...the need to construe transitional plans in a pragmatic way during the transitional period, and in that consideration to have regard to the "integrity" of such plans, must have at least persuasive authority in this Court; and with respect must be right. It would be an extraordinary position if a clear statement of legislative policy as to the regulation of land use by territorial local authorities were to have no significance in the interpretation of "transitional plans". At the same time, it would in my view be equally difficult to support the contention that such plans must now be re-interpreted in such a fashion as to ensure that they accord fully with, and promote only, the new and very different purposes of the 1991 Act. That endeavour would be a recipe for discontinuity and chaos in the planning process".

We agree with this statement entirely. This ground of appeal is also dismissed.

Ground 9. "That the Tribunal applied the wrong legal tests and misconstrued the Act when it concluded that the incorporation of Rule 4 in plan change No 6 is *intra vires* the Act, and in particular by concluding that Rule 4 is within the bounds of S.76 of the Act and by determining that Rule 4 is necessary with reference to the transitional plan rather than the provisions and purposes of the Act."

This ground is rather similar to Ground 4.

Rule 4 of plan change 6 provides: "Any activity not specified in rules 1-3 above or permitted by the Act is not permitted within the zone unless consent is obtained by way of a resource consent". The contention of the appellants is that this rule purports to require persons undertaking a number of activities expressly referred to in the district plan to acquire a resource consent before they can proceed. It was submitted that this rule was ultra vires the rule-making power of S.76 (cited above).

Counsel for the appellants drew on the well-known principles that a Court is reluctant to interpret a statute as restricting the rights of landowners to utilise their property unless that interpretation is necessary to give effect to the express words of the RMA Act; in a planning context, this principle is demonstrated by such authorities as Ashburton Borough v Clifford [1969] NZLR 921, 943. Counsel submitted that S.9 introduced a permissive regime and that the ability of the local authority to reverse that presumption is prescribed by S.74(4)(e); that normal principles of

statutory interpretation should properly have applied to the construction of S.76.

The Tribunal held that there must be one coherent planning instrument in the context of a hybrid transitional district plan and for the purposes of marrying provisions prepared under one Act which are to change a plan prepared under another Act. "We infer that the need in such circumstances for a rule requiring resource consent to be obtained for activities in one zone that are specifically referred to elsewhere in the plan has on balance more probably been overlooked from the list in S.76(4) than deliberately excluded. The rule is clearly within the general scope of S.76(1) and we do not consider that it was ultra vires respondent's powers".

The Tribunal did not find helpful (and neither do we) various maxims of statutory interpretation advanced by the appellants. The Tribunal could not believe that the Legislature intended, by providing expressly for such rules in the circumstances referred to in S.76(4)(e), to preclude similar rules in other cases where they are needed. We think the Tribunal's reasoning sound and find no reason to depart from it.

Mr Marquet referred to a decision of the Tribunal in Auckland City Council v Auckland Heritage Trust (1993), 1 NZRMA 69 where Judge Sheppard held that a reference

anywhere in a plan to a particular activity was sufficient to preclude the application of S.373 to a zone which did not permit that activity. We agree with the criticisms of Mr Marquet of this decision in that no reference was made in it to the ability of a Council to make different provisions for different parts of a district.

In that case, there had been a provision protecting buildings specified in the schedule from alteration or destruction. As alteration or destruction was referred to in the plan, the Judge held that other buildings were not constrained by the rule that demolition and construction can only take place with a resource consent because that requirement was limited only to the scheduled buildings. Such a view could have the effect of taking away control formerly had under the district scheme. However, we are not concerned with the correctness of the Auckland Heritage Trust decision.

Even if the Tribunal were wrong in that decision, then our view, already discussed under Ground 4, is that S.373(3) applies; a transitional district plan must be deemed to include a rule to the effect that every activity not specifically referred to in the plan is a non-complying activity.

We reject this ground of appeal.

Ground 10. "The Tribunal incorrectly applied the law relating to uncertainty and vagueness, and came to a decision which was so unreasonable in the circumstances, that no reasonable tribunal could reach the same, by holding that certain phrases in the rules in change No 6 are valid and have the requisite measure of certainty."

At the hearing before the Tribunal it was argued by the appellants that the rules contained a number of phrases which were vague and uncertain. The Tribunal listed a number of expressions so attacked, discussed relevant authorities and ruled on the matters listed. In some cases, it upheld the submission and either severed and deleted the phrase objected to or held the whole provision invalid. In other cases it rejected the submission made and upheld the validity of the phrase concerned.

In its decision, the Tribunal dealt with this aspect of the case as part of a wider group of matters under the heading "Whether rules 4 and 6 are ultra vires".

Countdown's notice of appeal para 7, under the same heading, specified a number of respects (including the present point) in which the Tribunal is alleged to be in error in that section of the decision.

As a result of pre-trial conferences and argument before Barker ACJ, the grounds of appeal were re-stated by the appellants jointly in 24 propositions or grounds and these were the bases on which (with some excisions and amalgamations) the appeal came before us.

In submissions for the appellant, Mr Wylie covered a number of matters raised in para 7 of the notice of appeal which are outside the ambit of ground 10. We confine ourselves to the specific issue raised by the ground as framed; i.e. whether in respect of the phrases upheld as valid by the Tribunal, it incorrectly applied the law and came to a decision which was so unreasonable in the circumstances that no reasonable tribunal could reach it.

As to the law, the Tribunal cited and quoted passages from the judgments of Davison CJ in Bitumix Ltd v Mt Wellington Borough, [1979] 2 NZLR 57, and McGechan J in McLeod Holdings v Countdown Properties (1990), 14 NZTPA 362. The Tribunal then said (p.81) -

"With those judgments to guide us and bearing in mind that unlike the former legislation the Resource Management Act does not stipulate that conditions for permitted use be 'specified', we return to consider the phrases challenged ..."

My Wylie questioned the validity of the distinction that the RMA, unlike the former legislation, does not stipulate that conditions for permitted uses be "specified". No submissions were made by other counsel in this respect and we are unclear about this step in the Tribunal's reasoning. We consider, however, that the correct approach was as indicated by the judgments cited; in our opinion the Tribunal would have reached the same result even if it had applied them alone and had not

borne in mind the further factor derived from the absence of the word "specified".

The Tribunal held, for example, that the phrase "appropriate design" and the limitation of signs to those "of a size related to the scale of the building..." were too vague and could not stand. On the other hand it determined that whether an existing sign is "of historic or architectural merit" and whether an odour is "objectionable", although matters on which opinions may differ, are questions of fact and degree which are capable of judgment and were upheld.

We do not consider that the Tribunal incorrectly applied the law or came to a decision that was so unreasonable that it could no stand. This ground of appeal is also dismissed.

Ground 11. That the Tribunal's conclusion that the land in the block the subject of Plan Change No 6 is in general an appropriate location for large scale vehicle orientated retailing is a conclusion which on the evidence it could not reasonably come to."

This ground was withdrawn at the hearing and is therefore dismissed.

Ground 12.. "That the Tribunal's decision accepting the evidence adduced by the second respondent about the economic effects of proposed change No 6 were so unreasonable, that no reasonable Tribunal, properly considering the evidence, and directing itself in law, could have made such a decision."

This ground relates to the evidence of a statistical retail consultant, Mr M.G. Tansley, who generally supported the plan change. No witness was called to contradict his evidence. The appellants made detailed and sustained criticisms of his evidence before the Tribunal and claimed that Mr Tansley did not have the relevant expertise to predict economic effects of the proposed change. The Tribunal held that an economist's analysis would not have assisted it any more than did Mr Tansley's.

In a close analysis of Mr Tansley's evidence, counsel for Countdown examined the witness's qualifications and his approach to a cost and benefit consideration of the proposed plan change; they alleged deficiencies in his predictions about the economic effects of the change. These matters were before the Tribunal when they made their assessment of the evidence. Its decision (p.34) records the Tribunal's appreciation of such criticisms.

The Court is dealing with the decision of an specialist Tribunal, well used to assessing evidence of the sort given by Mr Tansley, who was accepted by the Tribunal as an expert. We see no reason for holding that the Tribunal should not have accepted his evidence.

Although it is possible for this Court to hold in an appropriate case that there was no evidence to justify a finding of fact, it should be very loath to do so after the Tribunal's exhaustive hearing. The Tribunal is not

bound by the strict rules of evidence. Even if it were, the acceptance or rejection of Mr Tansley's evidence is a question of fact. We see this ground of appeal as an attempt to mount an appeal to this Court against a finding of fact by the Tribunal - which is not permitted by the RMA. We therefore reject this ground of appeal.

Ground 24. "The Tribunal erred in law and acted unreasonably by failing to consider either in whole or in part the evidence of the appellants and by reaching a decision regarding the merits of the plan change that no reasonable Tribunal considering that evidence before it and directing itself properly in law could reasonably have reached. In particular the Tribunal failed to consider the evidence of the following -

Anderson, Page, Nieper, Cosgrove, Hawthorne, Bryce, Chandrakumaran, Constantine, Edmonds,

This ground is similar to ground 12, so we consider it next. The appellants complaint here is that the Tribunal took considerable time to analyse the Council's and Woolworths' witnesses' views on the appropriateness of the location for the commercial zone and on the economic and social effects of allowing the proposed change. They claim, in contrast, that the witnesses called by the appellants on the same topics were not considered at all or not given the same degree of attention. The Tribunal heard full submissions by the appellants as to reliability of opposing witnesses, but, the appellants submitted before us, it failed to place any weight at all on the evidence given by the appellants' witnesses. The Tribunal was said to have been unfairly selective and that, therefore, its decision was against the weight of

evidence and one which no reasonable Tribunal could have reached.

Again, this submission must be considered in the light of the Tribunal's expertise. Even a cursory consideration of the extensive record shows that the hearing was extremely thorough; every facet and implication of the proposed scheme change appears to have been debated at length. The Tribunal conducted a site visit and a tour of suburban shopping centres. An analysis presented by Mr Gould shows that the witnesses whom the appellants claim were ignored in the decision were questioned by the presiding Judge. In the course of its decision (p.86), the Tribunal expressly confirmed that it was reaching a conclusion after "hearing the witnesses for the respondent and applicant cross-examined and hearing the witnesses for Foodstuffs and Countdown..." The Tribunal was not required in its judgment to refer to the evidence of each witness.

Once again, we are totally unable to hold that the Tribunal erred in law just because its thorough decision omitted to mention these witnesses by name. It is impossible for us to say that their evidence was not considered. Again, this ground comes close to be an appeal on fact masquerading as an appeal on a point of law. There is nothing to this ground of appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

Ground 13. "That the Tribunal applied the wrong legal tests and misconstrued the Act when it held that Change No 6 assisted the first respondent in carrying out its functions in order to achieve the statutory purpose contained in Part II of promoting sustainable management of natural and physical resources and that the change is in accordance with the function of S.31."

Ground 14. "The Tribunal misdirected itself in law by concluding that the content and provisions of Plan Change 6 promulgated under Part V of the Act are subject to the framework and legal premises of the first respondent's transitional district plan created under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977."

These grounds were included in the arguments on Grounds 8 and 9 and do not need to be considered separately.

Grounds 15, 16, 17 and 18:

15. "That the Tribunal erred in law by holding that S.290 of the Act did not apply to the references in Plan Change No 6."
16. "That the Tribunal misconstrued the statute when it held that it did not have the same duty as the first respondent to carry out the duties listed in S.32(1)."
17. "That the Tribunal misconstrued the Act when it held that it has the powers conferred by S.293, when considering a reference pursuant to clause 14."
18. "That the Tribunal misdirected itself by failing to apply the correct legal test when it purported to confirm Plan Change 6, namely by deciding that it was satisfied on balance that implementing the proposal would more fully serve the statutory purpose than would cancelling it."

The first step in the appellant's argument to the Tribunal on this part of the hearing was that S.290 of the RMA applied to the proceedings. That section reads -

"Powers of Tribunal in regard to appeals and inquiries -

- (1) The Planning Tribunal has the same power, duty, and discretion in respect of a decision appealed against, or to which an inquiry relates, as the person against whose decision the appeal or inquiry is brought.
- (2) The Planning Tribunal may confirm, amend, or cancel a decision to which an appeal relates.
- (3) The Planning Tribunal may recommend the confirmation, amendment or cancellation of a decision to which an inquiry relates.
- (4) Nothing in this section affects any specific power or duty the Planning Tribunal has under this Act or under any other Act or regulation."

The second step in the argument was that pursuant to S.290(1) the Tribunal had a duty to carry out a S.32(1) analysis in the same way as the Council had.

The Tribunal held that S.290 did not apply because the proceedings were not an appeal against the Council's decision as such and that the Tribunal was not under the same duty as the Council to carry out the duties listed in S.32(1). It went on to say -

"However the Tribunal's function is to decide whether the plan change should be confirmed, modified, amended, or deleted. To perform that function, the matters listed in S.32(1) are relevant. We therefore address those matters as a useful method to assist us to perform the Tribunal's functions on these references."

The Tribunal then considered those matters in detail.

The appellant's submission to this Court is that the Tribunal was wrong as a matter of law in holding that S.290 did not apply and in determining that it was not itself required to discharge the S.32 duties.

The Tribunal also held that S.293 of the RMA, unlike S.290, was applicable and that it had the powers conferred thereby. S.293 (in part) is as follows -

"Tribunal may order change to policy statements and plans

- (1) On the hearing of any appeal against, or inquiry into, the provisions of any policy statement or plan, the Planning Tribunal may direct that changes be made to the policy statement or plan.
- (2) If on the hearing of any such appeal or inquiry, the Tribunal considers that a reasonable case has been presented for changing or revoking any provision of a policy statement or plan, and that some opportunity should be given to interested parties to consider the proposed change or revocation, it may adjourn the hearing until such time as interested parties can be heard."

Although S.293 refers to "plan" which (by the relevant definition) means the operative district plan and changes thereto, the Tribunal considered that, because there is no mechanism by which there could be an appeal to the Tribunal against the provisions of an operative plan, for S.293 to have any application to plans, therefore, it must apply to appeals against provisions of proposed plans and proposed changes to plans. It accordingly held that the context requires that the defined meanings do not apply and that it has the powers conferred by S.293 in respect of a proposed change as well as those conferred by clause 15(2) of the First Schedule. That clause is as follows -

"(2) Where the Tribunal holds a hearing into any provision of a proposed policy statement or plan (other than a regional coastal plan) that reference

is an appeal, and the Tribunal may confirm, or direct the local authority to modify, delete, or insert, any provision which is referred to it."

The appellants submit that the Tribunal was wrong as a matter of law in holding that it had the powers conferred by S.293 in the present case.

Mr Marquet accepted (as he had before the Tribunal) that Ss.290 and 293 both applied and that the Tribunal had the powers set out in those provisions but contended, for reasons amplified in his submissions, that there had been no error of law.

Mr Gould supported the Tribunal's findings. He argued, however, that on a careful reading of the decision the Tribunal did not rely upon the powers contained in S.293 but instead on its jurisdiction under clause 15(2) of the First Schedule. It had correctly defined its function, he contended, and in the performance of that function, had reviewed all the elements of S.32. He submitted that even if the Tribunal had the duties under S.32 of the Council (but in a manner relevant to an appeal process), the steps it would have taken in its deliberation and judgment would have been no different. No material effect would arise, he submitted, if the Tribunal were found to be technically in error in its views as to Ss. 290 and 293.

We consider that, for the reasons given by the Planning Tribunal, it correctly determined that it had the powers

conferred by S.293 although we accept Mr Gould's submission that, in the end, the Tribunal did not exercise those powers and acted only pursuant to clause 15(2) of the First Schedule.

We differ from the Tribunal's conclusion as to S.290. In our view, the nature of the process before the Tribunal, although called a reference, is also, in effect an appeal, from the decision of the Council. In addition, the provisions in clause 15(2) that a reference of the sort involved here is an 'appeal' and a reference into a regional coastal plan pursuant to clause 15(3) is an 'inquiry' link, by the terminology used, clause 15 in the First Schedule with S.290.

The general approach that the Tribunal has the same duties, powers and discretions as the Council is not novel. S.150(1) and (2) of the TCPA conferred upon the Tribunal substantially the same powers as S.290(1) and (2) of the RMA; in particular, S.150(1) provided that the Tribunal has the same "powers duties functions and discretions" as the body at first instance. Under that legislation, the Tribunal's approach to plan changes was that the Tribunal is an appellate authority and not involved in the planning process as such. This principle was discussed in this Court in Waimea Residents Association Incorporated v Chelsea Investments Limited (Davison CJ, Wellington, M.616/81, 16 December 1981).

There was no provision in the TCPA corresponding to S.32 of the RMA but the judgment of Davison CJ is relevant as confirming the judicial and appellate elements of the Tribunal's function even although it had the same powers and duties as the Council.

We accept Mr Gould's submission that even if the Tribunal had decided that S.290 applied and it had the same duties as the Council (in a manner relevant to its appellate jurisdiction) the steps it would have taken in its deliberation and judgment would have been no different from those set out in detail in pages 121 to 125 of the decision.

The appellants argue next, in respect of ground 18, that the test required is not simply to decide whether on balance the provisions achieve the purpose of the RMA but whether they are in fact necessary. Alternatively, it is submitted that its construction of the word 'necessary' was not stringent enough in the context.

We deal with the alternative point first. The Tribunal in its decision discussed the submissions made by counsel and the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Environmental Defence Society Inc and Tai Tokerau District Maori Council v Mangonui County Council [1989] 13 NZTPA 197 and of Greig J in Wainuiomata District Council v Local Government Commission (Wellington, 20 September 1989, C.P.546/89).

The Tribunal considered that in S.32(1), 'necessary' requires to be considered in relation to achieving the purpose of the Act and the range of functions of Ministers and local authorities listed in S.32(2). In this context, it held that the word has a meaning similar to expedient or desirable rather than essential.

We agree with that view and do not consider that the Tribunal was in error in law.

We return now to the appellants' primary submission.

It is true that the Tribunal said (at p.128) -

"On balance we are satisfied that implementing the proposal would more fully serve the statutory purpose than would cancelling it, and that the respondent should be free to approve the plan change."

But we do not think it is correct that the Tribunal adopted this test in place of the more rigorous requirement that it be satisfied that the provisions are necessary. S.32 is part only of the statutory framework; by S.74, a territorial authority is to prepare and change its district plan in accordance with its functions under S.31, the provisions of Part II, its duty under S.32 and any regulations. This was fully apprehended by and dealt with appropriately by the Tribunal. It said at p.127 -

"We have found that the content of proposed Plan Change 6 would, if implemented, serve the statutory

purpose of promoting sustainable management of natural and physical resources in several respects; and that the proposal would reasonably serve that purpose; and would serve the aims of efficient use and development of natural and physical resources, the maintenance and enhancement of amenity values, the recognition and protection of the heritage values of building and areas; and the maintenance and enhancement of the quality of the environment.

We have also found that the measure is capable of assisting the respondent to carry out its functions in order to achieve that purpose, and is in accordance with those functions under S.31; that its objectives, policies and rules are necessary, in the sense of expedient, for achieving the purpose of the Act; that the proposed rules are as likely to be effective as such rules are able to be; and that the objectives, policies and rules of the plan change are in general the most appropriate means of exercising the respondent's function."

The Tribunal went on to deal with possible alternative locations, the road system, pedestrian safety, the obstruction of fire appliances leaving the fire station, non-customers' use of carparking, and adverse economic and social effects. It then concluded with the passage which, the appellants contend, shows that the Tribunal adopted the wrong test by saying that on balance it was satisfied that implementing the proposal would more fully serve the statutory purpose than cancelling it.

In our view, the Tribunal applied the correct test when considering the relevant part of S.32; it asked itself whether it was satisfied that the change was necessary and held, after a full examination, that it was. On the basis of that and numerous other findings, it then proceeded to the broader and ultimate issue of whether it should confirm the change or direct the Council to modify, delete or insert any provision which had been

referred to it. It determined that, on balance, implementing the proposal would more fully serve the statutory purpose than would cancelling it and that the Council should accordingly be free to approve the plan change. Reading the relevant part of the Tribunal's decision as a whole we consider that its approach was correct and that it did not err in law as the appellants contend. This ground of appeal is dismissed.

Ground 19. "That the Tribunal misdirected itself when it determined that the onus of proof rested with the appellant Transit to establish a case that approving Plan Change No 6 would result in adverse effects on the traffic environment."

Ground 20. "In considering Plan Change No 6 in terms of S.5 of the Act the Tribunal erred in failing to consider the effects of the Plan Change on the sustainable management of the State Highway, on the reasonably foreseeable transportation needs of future generations, and on the needs of the people of the district, pedestrians, and road users, as to their health and safety, and on the need to avoid, remedy or mitigate adverse effects of the plan change on the transportation environment of the Dunedin district."

Ground 21. "The Tribunal erred in determining that the Plan Change would create no adverse effects on the State Highway and on persons using and crossing the State Highway."

Ground 22. "In considering the effectiveness of the rules contained in the plan change the Tribunal erred in failing to take account of the fact that in respect of permitted and controlled activities allowed by the plan change the general ordinances of the transitional district plan as to vehicle access are ultra vires and of no effect."

Ground 23. "The Tribunal erred in considering the effectiveness of the rules contained in the Plan Change, and in particular wrongly determined that the issue of what are appropriate rules for vehicle access should be resolved by the appellant and the first respondent through the process of proposed draft plan change 7 or some informal process."

These grounds were not argued because of the settlement reached by Transit with the Council and Woolworths. However, because all the other appellants' grounds of appeal have been dismissed, we have now to consider submissions from those appellants as to why the settlement should not be implemented in the manner suggested.

The settlement arrived at amongst Transit, the Council and Woolworths provided for certain rules as to access to the site to be incorporated in the plan change. Details of these rules were annexed to the parties' agreement and submitted to the Court. Counsel for Transit sought an order that the now agreed rules be referred back to the Tribunal where the parties would seek appropriate orders by consent incorporating the new rules. Such a procedure was only to be necessary if the appeals by Countdown and Foodstuffs alleging the invalidity of the planning change were unsuccessful. We have ruled that they are. We therefore consider the viability of implementing the Transit settlement.

Counsel for Countdown who submitted that the new rules contained within the settlement agreement required public notification before the local authority or Tribunal could proceed to include them in the plan change. Further, it was contended that the Tribunal had refused such proposed amendments sought by Transit upon the basis that Transit's submission to the Council had not specifically

stated the amendments sought and that that was final because it had not been appealed. Reference was made to S.295 of the RMA viz -

"that a decision of the Planning Tribunal ... is final unless it is re-heard under S.294 or appealed under S.299."

It was further agreed that Transit's grounds of appeal did not embrace the new rules but rather dealt with the procedure adopted by the Tribunal in advising both Transit and the Council actively to consider the issues raised by Transit's proposed amendments.

All parties accepted that the Tribunal had power under clause 15(2) of the First Schedule to confirm or to direct the local authority to modify, delete or insert any provision which had been referred to it; as well, it had powers to direct changes under S.293 of the RMA. The latter power includes a specific power to adjourn a hearing if it considers that some opportunity should be given to interested parties to be notified of and to consider the proposed change. The detailed procedure is contained in S.293(3).

On the penultimate page of its decision the Tribunal stated -

"The other two amendments sought by Transit would replace general provisions about the design of vehicle accesses to car parking and service and loading areas with detailed rules containing specific standards. However, although Transit's submission to the respondent on the plan change

referred to pedestrians crossing Cumberland Street mid-block, and to the design and location of accesses and exits, it did not state that the submitter wished the respondent specifically to make the amendments that were sought in Transit's reference to the Tribunal. Further, those amendments were not put to the respondent's traffic engineering witness, Mr N.S. Read, in cross-examination by Transit's counsel.

The applicants' traffic engineering witness, Mr Tuohey, proposed a different rule about design and location of vehicle accesses, and that is also a topic currently being considered within the Council administration, focusing on a draft Plan Change 7. In all those circumstances, we do not feel confident that the specific provisions sought by Transit would necessarily be the most appropriate means of addressing the concern raised by it. We are content to know that both Transit and the respondent are actively considering the issues which the amendments sought by Transit are intended to address."

We do not read those paragraphs, in the context of the Tribunal's decision as a whole, as a concluded finding upon Transit's reference to the Tribunal. We accept that these amendments, now settled upon, may be within the Tribunal's jurisdiction under S.293 or clause 15(2) of the First Schedule.

In Port Otago Limited v Dunedin City Council (Dunedin, A.P.112/93, 15 November 1993, Tipping J expressed the view that it would be a rare case in an appeal on a point of law where this Court could substitute its own conclusions on the factual matters underlying the point of law for that of the Tribunal. He considered, and we agree, that unless the correctly legal approach could lead to only one substitute result, the proper course is to remit the matter to the Tribunal as R.718A(2) of the High Court Rules empowers.

Accordingly, we allow Transit's appeal by consent and remit to the Tribunal for its further consideration and determination the possible exercise of its powers under S.293 or Clause 15(2) of the First Schedule in relation to the rules forming part of the settlement.

Since this judgment may have interest beyond the facts of this case and because we have mentioned R.718A of the High Court Rules, we make some comments about the scheme of the Act relating to appeals to this Court.


Section 300-307 of the RMA provide detailed procedure for the institution of appeals to this Court under S.299 and for the procedure up to the date of hearing. In our view, it is unfortunate that such detailed matters of procedure are fixed by statute. Our reasons are: (a) statutes are far more difficult to alter than Rules of Court should some procedural amendment be considered desirable; (b) most statutes are content to leave procedural aspects to the Rules once the statute has conferred the right of appeal; (c) the High Court Rules in Part X aim for a uniform procedure for all appeals to this Court other than appeals from the District Court. There is much to be said for having the same rules for similar kinds of appeals.

Although the RMA goes into considerable detail on procedure, it is silent on the powers of the Court upon hearing an appeal from the Tribunal. One might have

thought that the power of the Court on hearing an appeal might have been a better candidate for legislative precision than detailed provisions which are similar to but not identical to well-understood and commonly used rules of Court. We hope that, at the next revision of the Act, consideration be given to reducing the procedural detail in Ss.300-307 and that the same measure of confidence be reposed in the Rules of Court as can be found in other legislation granting appeal rights from various tribunals or administrative bodies.

Result:

The appeals of Countdown and Foodtown are dismissed. The appeal of Transit is allowed by consent in the manner indicated. Woolworths and the Council are both entitled to costs. We shall receive memoranda from counsel if agreement cannot be reached.

R. D. Barker, J.

James J.

Solicitors: Gallaway Haggitt Sinclair, Dunedin, for Foodstuffs
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