

So, you're thinking of running for council in this year's local body elections ...

Scope of the webinar



First things first. You are thinking of running for election to your local authority. This webinar will help you understand what the role involves and how you can develop your skills to fulfil it. The webinar is a valuable introduction to the role you will play and the challenges you will face and will take two hours of your time from 8.00pm to 10.00 on 30 June, via Zoom. It will also be available to be watched via a recording after the event .

Although councils are corporate entities, and are businesses in the sense that they need to balance their income and expenditure, their purpose has historically been to provide infrastructure (e.g., roads and drains) and selected services (e.g., libraries), as part of their wider purpose of promoting community wellbeing and democratic decision-making, and their activities are legislatively defined.¹ As a councillor your role will be one of governance: working with fellow-councillors and the mayor to establish policy and strategy. The actual operations of council are managed by the Chief Executive (**Fig. 1**). Think of it in the way you go to a restaurant: you decide the meal you want, but normally you don't go out to the kitchen and cook it.




Fig. 1. Schematic locations of governance (coloured purple) and management (coloured buff) responsibilities in local government. Solid arrows (e.g., →) show employment relationships; open arrows (e.g., ⇄) show functional relationships

*The Chief Executive reports to the Council and is a key adviser to councillors, the appointment of the Chief Executive is the responsibility of the council, as are the annual performance reviews of the Chief Executive. The Council also is responsible for the adoption of the audited long-term plan, following informal and formal consultation with the community. Consultation is an important part of the role of Council, both collectively and individually.

† Managers of council departments or portfolios sometimes are invited to Council meetings to brief councillors, but they are not members of Council. In Councils that have 'Council-controlled organisations', these organisations may include a combination of managers and elected councillors, and sometimes external experts. These variations are discussed later in this document.

Your views and responsible decision-making

As a councillor, you will not be employed by ratepayers, but you will be accountable to them, and they may expect that your decision-making accords with the views of the majority of them. You probably think, “Disappoint them and you may be a ‘one-term wonder’.” Actually, it’s not as simple as this, because while, as an elected councillor, you get to formally approve projects that are not only consistent with the strategy and policy that you and other councillors develop, the projects also need to provide value for money and meet the needs of ratepayers’ and citizens. This requires you to look objectively at proposals and projects, and prioritise the views of the community above your own.

Philosopher Professor Anthony Grayling (**Fig. 2**)² points out that candidates for councils often miscomprehend the concept of representation: rather than slavish adherence to their own views, representatives have:



Fig. 2. Professor A.C. Grayling – the webinar’s first guest speaker


*“the duty to ‘deliberate upon matters of common concern, and to decide according to the best of their judgment’, and not merely be messengers carrying out the wishes of the electorate”.*³

Specifically, he observes, “Those elected have to be fit for the purpose of acquiring information, examining it, listening to arguments relating to it, forming judgments, submitting their judgments to the scrutiny of others, changing their minds if they encounter evidence and reasons that compel a change of mind – and reaching decisions that responsibly address the interests of more than their own partisan loyalties.”^{4, 5}

So, what sort of decisions do councillors need to make? In broad terms councils have a legislative requirement to promote the economic, environmental, social and cultural wellbeing of the district or city or region that they cover.

The Office of the Auditor-General provides an annual overview of changes to reporting arrangements and new activities: for 2019 and 2020, aspects covered included: a ‘refocus’ on wellbeing, as a consequence of the amendment of the Local Government Act 2002 (**Fig. 3**), observing that when councils were last required to do this (i.e., before its removal from the Act), reporting was not very effective;⁶ and the observation that councils continued to downplay the effects of climate change and were not proactively including this in their current and future plans,⁷ effectively echoing the concerns expressed by the Productivity Commission on these matters.⁸

Fig. 3. Representation as ‘pillars’ of the four wellbeings referred to in Clause 10 (1) (b) of the ‘Purpose of local Government’ in New Zealand, viz, “to promote the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of communities in the present and for the future.” From the Local Government Act 2002, Version as at 15 November 2021⁹



In addition, the Commission advocated for ‘improved decision-making by councils’, ‘more collaboration between councils’, and ‘better community engagement’. Elected councillors should seek – both collectively and individually – to progress at least the first and last of these items.

Independent assessments of the effectiveness of councils

You might ask how effective your predecessor councillors have been. Although examples are given later of media coverage of some councils’ activities, one process which offers some analysis of performance is the inter-council comparison scheme, CouncilMARK™, in which the performance of council in each of four ‘pillars’ and overall (**Fig. 4**) is evaluated by an external panel. Currently, fewer than half of New Zealand’s councils currently participate in this scheme, suggesting that there is a need for a standards-based and objective performance review framework for this sector.




Table 1 (below) shows that the average CouncilMARK overall score increases for larger councils, probably because these councils are better resourced financially and logistically, to undertake the tasks pertinent to the achievement of the ‘pillars’ and also to prepare the self-evaluation document for the external panel to peruse. Of more importance, however, is that CouncilMARK scores – whether for each ‘pillar’ or overall – are comparatively modest, typically averaging a score of about 5 out of a maximum possible score of 9 (i.e., 60%). Not only this, but determination of reputation indexes for ‘performance’, ‘leadership’, ‘communication’ and ‘overall’ by Councils’ own ‘industry body’,

Table 1. CouncilMARK average scores for the four types of councils in New Zealand, as at April 2022*

Type of council†	No. of assessments¶	CouncilMARK scores for ‘pillars’ /priority areas and overall				
		LL‡	IMW‡	DWI‡	L&R‡	Overall¶
SP/RU	14	4.07	4.36	4.57	4.78	4.29
SM/LP	14	5.5	5.79	5.29	6.21	5.93
LM	1	6	8	6	7	7
RC	4	6.25	6.75	6.25	6.25	6.75

Table 1 continues on following page

*A table showing scores for each council that has participated in CouncilMARK and for which results of assessments are available as at April 2022 is shown as **Extended Table 1** before the Appendices at the end of this document.

¶ Five councils have had two CouncilMARK assessments, as at April 2022, the results of two of these further assessments are publicly available and are included in this compilation and in **Extended Table 1**.

† Types of council: SP/RU, Small Provincial/Rural; SM/LP, Small Metro/Large Provincial; LM, Large Metro; RC, Regional Council

‡ 'Pillar' scores: Struggling; 2, Under-performing; 3, Areas for improvement; 4, Variable; 5, Competent; 6, More than competent; 7, Performing well; 9, Standout; 9, Exemplary.

¶ Overall Ratings: **C**, under-performing; **CC**, More than two areas of improvement; **CCC**, Two areas of improvement identified; **B**, One area of improvement identified; **BB**, Competent; **BBB**, Some areas of strength – overall competent; **A**, Some areas of strength and leadership; **AA**, Strong grades in most priority areas (i.e., 'pillars' of Fig. 4); **AAA**, Exemplary.

Local Government New Zealand, in the mid-2010s averaged less than 30%,¹⁰ and correlate strongly with the relevant CouncilMARK data (**Table 2**).¹¹

Table 2. Comparison of Local Government New Zealand's average council reputation percentages (2017) with scores for corresponding CouncilMARK™ 'pillars' (2017-2019)

LGNZ reputation index			CouncilMARK	
Average reputation (%)	Component of reputation index		Corresponding pillar	Average score for pillar
27%	Performance	←→	(IMW + DWI)/2	5.51 (61%)
26%	Leadership	←→	LL	5.41 (60%)
30%	Communication	←→	L&R	6.11 (68%)
27.9%	Overall	←→	Overall	5.71 (63%)

While it is reasonable to attribute scores for 'performance' (or CouncilMARK's 'Investing Money Well' [IMW] and 'Delivering What's Important' [DWI] 'pillars') principally to the activities of Council staff themselves, the contractors they engage or the subsidiary bodies they establish,¹² elected councillors and mayors need to reflect on the generally low scores in 'leadership' (or CouncilMARK's 'Leading Locally' [LL] 'pillar') and in 'communication' (or CouncilMARK's 'Listening and Responding' [L&R] 'pillar').

In summary, ratepayers and citizens do not appear to be particularly well served by councils, whose performance across a range of measures – whether assessed by 'experts' (e.g., the Auditor-General or the Productivity Commission) or by councils' own 'industry body' (Local Government New Zealand) – is hardly stellar. Perhaps in New Zealand's local government:

"... It is no longer relevant or acceptable for public sector leaders to promote, let alone deploy, the concept of benevolent municipalism in which the 'great and good' believe they know what's best for the citizen."¹³ Hierarchical power is, rightly, giving way to networked authority the roots of which are firmly in the community. We do not exist in our own right. The political leadership is elected and the officers are appointed by the democratically mandated. We are all here to serve others – and that is the only kind of power we are entitled to wield: we rule only in order to serve." (Fig. 5A)¹⁴



Fig. 5. Views from Birmingham. **A** (Left): Mark Rogers, Chief Executive Birmingham City Council says, “We are all here to serve others...” **B** (Centre and Right): Local government researchers at the University of Birmingham. **B1** (Centre): Professor Catherine Needham; **B2** (Right): Professor Catherine Mangan

A more consultative and collaborative approach to local government

Researchers into local government in the United Kingdom (**Fig. 5B1, 5B2**) illustrated their findings in terms of the attributes they considered were needed for 21st century councillors in **Fig. 6**.¹⁵ The diagram implies that strong inter-personal skills that enable collaboration, communication, and commitment to community are vital to the various roles that councillors might perform, but indicates that knowledge is important as well. As the guardians of the wellbeing of their district, city, or region, and also of the financial investment in the district, city, or region by ratepayers and citizens via rates “...the need to serve others...” referred to above should be a paramount objective of any councillor.



Fig. 6. ‘The 21st Century Councillor’. A representation of the skills, attributes and values which effective publicly elected mayors and councillors will need in the future. From: Mangan, C., Needham, C., Bottom, K., and Parker, S. *The 21st Century Councillor*
<https://21stcenturypublicservant.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/21st-century-councillor.pdf>

Service to others could be compromised by the lack of openness and transparency in council decision-making,¹⁶ which appear to limit or deny public scrutiny of councils’ decision-making. Concerns over the validity and legitimacy of consultation with citizens also compromise openness and transparency. The number of submissions to long-term plans is very small (**Table 3**),¹⁷ and there is usually little publicly available information about the fate of submissions that are made.¹⁸

Table 3. Submissions to Long-term Council Community Plan

	Submissions to Long-term Plan (LTP)		L&R Score*	Submissions as % of population served by council†		L&R score*
	Council	Number		Council	%	
Highest	Hastings District Council	1125	7	Ruapehu District Council	1.6%	7
Average‡		444			0.94%	
Lowest	Rangitikei District Council	125	5	Waikato Regional Council	0.08%	6

*'Listening and Responding' (L&R) score in CouncilMARK:5, Competent; 6, Better than competent; 7, Performing well
† See also **Fig. EN21**
‡ Average number or % for the 17 councils participating in the CouncilMARK scheme for which data on submissions to the LTPs were available in January 2019

This, coupled with poor voter turnout in elections,¹⁹ may well fuel ratepayers' perception of the futility of engagement with their council.²⁰ That said, there appears to be a trend for the number of submissions as a proportion of the population to increase with the CouncilMARK score, particularly for district councils.²¹ This positive trend might lead us to wonder cautiously whether smaller councils care more about what their ratepayers think than do their larger counterparts.

Several examples of issues related to consultation are included in **Appendix 1** of this document.²²

Transparency

Mention has already been made of 'commercial sensitivity' being grounds for lack of disclosure of council decision-making. Given that 'business relationships' with councils are invariably supported with ratepayer funding, there appears to be no justification in maintaining secrecy from ratepayers. The same preference for transparency should also apply to so-called 'public-private partnerships', where generally the public component of the partnership carries a high proportion of the financial risk, while the 'private' component of the partnership retains a secure investment.²³



Fig. 7. Professor Karin Lasthuizen, Brian Picot Chair in Ethical Leadership, Victoria University of Wellington

Problems can arise in these arrangements because New Zealand is a 'small village'²⁴ –which means that “the market of supply and demand is not optimal” and, as Karin Lasthuizen observes, “*this increases the likelihood of conflicts of interest, intermingling of politics and public service, nepotism in recruitment processes, and favouritism within work environments*” (**Fig. 7**).²⁵ Given that the level of trust in local government dealing with local problems is already less than the level of trust in the Government's dealing with national problems,²⁶ council-controlled organisations (the latter of which generally include non-Council members on its governance body)²⁷ might not necessarily be the best choice of regime at the local level. Either of 'in-house' management of these facilities and services or even withdrawing from such provision altogether (see **Appendix 2** of this document) may be preferable.

Co-governance and co-management

This not a new idea; many councils have committees or 'council-controlled organisations', where expertise from outside the Council is recognised as being appropriate or useful: in many towns

museum boards are long-standing examples, while entities such as Wellington Water (see Endnote 12 and **Appendix 3** of this document) are relative newcomers.

Co-governance and co-management of resources has taken on a new significance when applied to the intention to incorporate and value the perspectives of those who have a traditional interest or connection to the resource being managed, but who have not historically participated in local governance and management, and who also may not necessarily have the knowledge or skills to contribute to the resolution of problems affecting the resource.²⁸ A recent media commentary on this practice follows.

“Power-sharing regimes in resource management are now common.^[29] Some are mandated through Treaty settlements (like the Waikato River Authority) others are voluntary (such as shared responsibility for the management of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere).^[30]

“The terms co-governance and co-management are often used interchangeably. But co-management is probably most accurate, because in most cases the final decision rests with the local authority, in keeping with their councils' responsibilities under the Resource Management Act and the Local Government Act. This has not been without problems. There is consternation about the protection of biodiversity and public access in Te Urewera, following a ground-breaking deal which handed the former National Park back to Ngāi Tūhoe. And privately, some tourism operators, scientists and conservationists worry the Department of Conservation's interpretation of its role as a Treaty partner is effectively handing veto rights to iwi on any activity on conservation land. Upcoming conservation law reform is likely to sharpen that discussion. Even within Left-leaning sections of the public service, there is a creeping unease about how much Māori analysis is seeping into policy development, and the lack of transparency in what the Government wants to achieve.

“In a post Treaty settlement era (not a post Treaty era, as some would like) the model is evolving beyond resource management and into public service delivery. Work on how the Treaty can be applied at a policy level has been going on for years, and Whānau Ora and kohanga reo are clear examples. But the Government's plans for a Māori Health Authority and the reform of Three Waters management have re-awakened the taniwha.”³¹

Co-governance and co-management are issues that are a focus of the current Local Government Review,³² as is the strengthening of iwi/Māori representation, including through the introduction of Māori wards. From her research interests in Māori politics including constitutional change and Māori representation, voting in local and general elections, and Māori resource management economy including renewable energy, freshwater, mining and biodiversity, Maria Bargh (**Fig. 8**) has observed:



Fig. 8. Associate Professor Maria Bargh, Te Kawa a Māui |School of Māori Studies, Victoria University of Wellington

“... the challenges on the path to building Treaty-based local government relationships... begin with the terminology used to describe and study this topic and connect to the attitudes commonly held by non-Māori councillors and include resistance to establishing Māori wards/constituencies. Despite those challenges, when voter turnout is examined for Māori wards/constituencies themselves there do not appear to be any specific additional electoral challenges separate from those aforementioned... There are increasing numbers of councils attempting to introduce political processes to allow for iwi contributions to decision-making. This includes attempts to enable Māori to follow their own voting process and elect their own independent representatives to parallel political entities which they can partner with....”³³



Fig. 9. Professor Felipe Fernández - Armesto, a British professor of history, is currently the William P. Reynolds Professor of History at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, United States.

Bargh’s comments predate the increase in Māori wards for this year’s elections, following the legislative change removing the right for communities to demand a poll if a council decided it wanted to establish Māori wards. On such matters Fernández-Armesto (**Fig. 9**)³⁴ sounds a note of caution:

*“No one has seriously recommended equalizing age or brainpower or beauty or stature or fatness or physical prowess or luck; some inequalities genuinely are natural. It is noble to try to remedy their effects, but nobility in the pursuit of equality tends always to be condescending.... For those who believe in the natural equality of all, the state is there to enforce it; for those who do not, government has a moral role, levelling the ‘playing field’, redressing the imbalances between the strong and the weak, the rich and the poor...”*³⁵

Implementing the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples³⁶ in New Zealand would require a choice to be made between such options. Whatever choice is made, there remains a fundamental democratic principle, articulated by Dame Anne Salmond in May 2022, in response to the Rotorua Council Representation Bill,³⁷ tentatively opposed by the Attorney General:³⁸



Fig. 10. Professor Dame Anne Salmond, University of Auckland

“The Attorney General’s intervention is timely, with his reminder that the rights to equal representation and freedom from discrimination are fundamental constitutional principles in Aotearoa New Zealand.

“No New Zealander should be asked to accept that, by virtue of their birth, they are less worthy than any other. And the chances that if they are asked, they will agree, are vanishingly small, because to do so is to surrender their dignity as a person.

“As it states in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’

*“No ifs, no buts, no exceptions.”*³⁹

Despite such concerns, councillors and council staff, while individually holding a variety of views, could come together to develop effective and enduring co-managerial solutions to environmental and social issues, effectively balancing ‘lordship and stewardship’ with the optimism that Fernández-Armesto suggests below:

*“Genius pullulates when intellectuals gather in institutions of education and research, where they can talk to each other. The broader the forum the better. When cultures are in dialogue, ideas seem to breed, enriching each other and generating new thinking...”*⁴⁰

The Review into Local Government April 2022 newsletter recognised the value of this approach – pluralism⁴¹ – in respect of some of its recent discussions:

*“We talked about the need to collaborate with others who also work with local government, bringing together all those who can help improve community wellbeing and cohesively tackle complex issues. This approach was likened to a pot luck kai, each group around the table bringing their speciality and contributing what they can to improve the situation. This analogy will be something we bring with us as we continue our mahi.”*⁴²

In effect, political change can occur alongside community development and management of resources, as Pahia Turia’s experience attests.



Fig. 11. Pahia Turia, chair of Te Rūnanga o Ngā Wairiki – Ngāti Apa,⁴³ the webinar’s second guest speaker

For the forthcoming local body elections, there has been a significant increase in the number of Māori wards following the legislative change removing the right of councils to demand a poll if a council decided it wanted to establish Māori wards. As an example, the Rangitikei District Council has determined that there will be two Māori-ward councillors. Pahia Turia will share his perspective on this development, and how he thinks it might play out in decision-making by the new council. As some other councils have done, Rangitikei District Council had previously established an iwi advisory council, and he may comment on how such an advisory body might be regarded by an incoming council which now has Māori wards.

Of course, such a collaborative approach need not preclude the involvement of others in the community, as Megan Courtney has commented,

“Having worked in the community change space for more than two decades, it’s clear to me that the biggest potential for change comes when top-down, and bottom-up meet somewhere in the middle. the magic happens when trusted relationships enable everyone’s expertise, energy and resources to be harnessed...”⁴⁴

Her involvement has been particularly with ‘Inspiring Communities’⁴⁵, a place-based approach to community-led development, which, as **Fig 12** implies, has at least a nod to Māori kaupapa.




Fig. 12. Representation of a place-based approach to community led development (Courtney 2019, fig. 1.)

Practices inhibiting good management by councils

Recent examples of management deficiencies that can be attributed to council staff include councils’ poor management of infrastructure, (e.g., Hawkes Bay Regional Council and associated district councils management of water supplies⁴⁶; and Environment Canterbury’s curious and contrasting behaviour in not prosecuting stockmen using waterways illegally,⁴⁷ but prosecuting itself for polluting⁴⁸); public transport, e.g., Wellington Regional Council⁴⁹); and council processes related to development (e.g., Tauranga City Council⁵⁰ and Porirua City Council⁵¹ – related to building consent processes for townhouse developments, Wellington City Council – related to Shelley Bay proposal⁵²).

The adverse publicity around these types of issues has triggered, at least in part, the proposed re-arrangement of the management of water, wastewater, and stormwater (the so-called ‘Three Waters’ reform).⁵³


Although contentious, and opposed by some councils and political groups, the current government is committed to its implementation. The long-signalled reform of the Resource Management Act seems likely to have implications for local bodies, both in terms of their control of land use and building structures,⁵⁴ but also in terms of Council income derived from fees for consenting activities.

All that said, it is pertinent to conclude by noting that much of local government is undertaken without incurring the gaze – or wrath – of citizens or the media; indeed, some activities are novel and even award-winning – at least within the local authority ‘industry’,⁵⁵ a recent example of which is the winner of the Annual Excellence Awards of Taituarā Local Government Professionals Aotearoa, Far North District Council, for its Project for Wellbeing.

Practices inhibiting good governance by councils

Other adverse reporting by media has focused on so-called ‘vanity projects’,⁵⁶ particularly those that appear to be driven by mayors (e.g., Wellington City Council – film museum / international conference facility;⁵⁷ Kapiti District Council – beachside visitor centre (see Endnote 22) and bureaucratic processes that appear to inhibit community activities (e.g., Porirua City Council – traffic management charges for community Anzac Day celebrations;⁵⁸ bureaucratic interventions related to volunteers cleaning and clearing war graves prior to Anzac Day⁵⁹). These are the types of activities that could and probably should be used by councillors to call to account not only mayors, but also – via the mayor (having regard to the distinction between governance and management previously referred to) – the council staff.

Also gaining adverse attention in the media are commentaries related to the interpersonal relationships among councillors (or between mayors and councillors) that reduce the effectiveness of governance (e.g., Tauranga City Council, currently replaced by commissioners) and Wellington City Council (riven by factional in-fighting, resulting in expenditure on facilitation, mediation, etc.). Karin Lasthuizen’s comment in respect of business leaders’ behaviour:



“...the character, behaviour, and decision-making that a leader demonstrates by means of role modelling, reinforcement, and communication to motivate employees to make decisions and behave in accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules.”⁶⁰

... is surely equally applicable in the local government context. For a final comment in this part of the webinar, Sophie Handford (**Fig. 13**), a first-time councillor with the Kapiti District Council, shares her perspective.

Dramatis personae

Host presenter
Professor Giroi Karacaoglu



Head of School of Government,
Victoria University of Wellington

First guest presenter
Professor Anthony Grayling



Master of New College of the
Humanities, London

Second guest presenter
Pahia Turia



Chair of Te Rūnanga o Ngā Wairiki –
Ngāti Apa

Third guest presenter
Sophie Handford



Councillor, Kapiti Coast District
Council

Extended Table 1. CouncilMARK™ results as at June 2022

Participating Council	Report date	CouncilMARK Priority areas / 'pillars'				CouncilMARK Overall rating*
		Leading locally (LL)	Investing money Wisely (IMW)	Delivering What's Important (DWI)	Listening and Responding (L&R)	
Bay of Plenty Regional Council (RC)†	December 2020	6, Better than competent	5, competent	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	6, BBB
Central Hawke's Bay District Council (SP/RU)	November 2021	8, Stand-out	7, Performing well	7, Performing well	8, Standout	8, AA
	October 2018	7	4	3	7	5, BB
	Latest – former	+1	+3	+4	+1	+3
Dunedin City Council (LM)	February 2019	6, Better than competent	8, Standout	6, Better than competent	7, Performing well	7, A
Environment Canterbury (RC)	August 2018	7, Performing well	6, Better than competent	6, Better than competent	5, Competent	6, BBB
Far North District Council (SM/LP)	October 2017	4, Variable	5, Competent	4, Variable	6, Better than competent	4, B
Greater Wellington Regional Council (RC)	March 2018	6, Better than competent	8, Standout	7, Performing well	8, Standout	8, AA
Hastings District Council (SM/LP)	October 2017	7, Performing well	6, Better than competent	6, Better than competent	7, Performing well	7, A
Hauraki District Council (SP/RU)	February 2019	8, Standout	5, Competent	7, Performing well	8, Standout	7, A
Horowhenua District Council (SM/LP)	August 2021	5, Competent	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	6, Better than competent	5, BB
	July 2017	4, Variable	5, Competent	4, Variable	5, Competent	4, B,
	Latest – former	+1	0	+2	+1	+1
Mackenzie District Council (SP/RU)	August 2021	5, Competent	3, Areas for improvement	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	4, B
	May 2018	4, Variable	5, Competent	4, Variable	5, Competent	4, B
	Latest – former	+1	-2	+1	+1	0
Manawatu District Council (SP/RU)	October 2019	5, Competent	5, Competent	7, Performing well	6, Better than competent	6, BBB
Masterton District Council (SP/RU)	October 2017	5, Competent	5, Competent	5, Competent	5, Competent	5, BB
Matamata-Piako District Council (SM/LP)	July 2017	5, Competent	7, Performing well	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	6, BBB

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Extended Table 1 (continued). CouncilMARK™ results as at June 2022

Participating Council	Report date	CouncilMARK Priority areas / 'pillars'				CouncilMARK Overall rating*
		Leading locally (LL)	Investing money Wisely (IMW)	Delivering What's Important (DWI)	Listening and Responding (L&R)	
Napier City Council (SM/LP)	July 2017	7, Performing well	7, Performing well	6, Better than competent	6, Better than competent	7, A
Nelson City Council (SM/LP)	October 2017	4, Variable	4, Variable	5, Competent	5, Competent	5, BB
New Plymouth District Council (SM/LP)	February 2019	6, Better than competent	6, Better than competent	5, Competent	7, Performing well	6, BBB
Northland Regional Council (RC)	Pending					
Otorohanga District Council (SP/RU)	December 2020	3, Areas for improvement	4, Variable	4, Variable	3, Areas for improvement	3, CCC
Porirua City Council (SM/LP)	July 2017	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	4, Variable	7, Performing well	6, BBB
Queenstown Lakes District Council (SM/LP)	July 2017	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	4, Variable	7, Performing well	6, BBB
Rangitikei District Council (SP/RU)	June 2022	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	6, Better than competent	5, Competent	5, BB
	October 2017	5, Competent	7, Performing well	5, Competent	5, Competent	5, BB
	Latest – former	0	-1	+1	0	0
Ruapehu District Council (SP/RU)	July 2017	4, Variable	3, Areas for improvement	6, Better than competent	7, Performing well	5, BB
South Taranaki District Council (SP/RU)	October 2017	6, Better than competent	6, Better than competent	6, Better than competent	5, Competent	6, BBB
Tararua District Council (SP/RU)	October 2018	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	5, BB
Taupo District Council (SP/RU)	February 2018	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	6, BBB
Upper Hut City Council (SM/LP)	August 2018	5, Competent	4, Variable	5, Competent	5, Competent	5, BB
Waikato Regional Council (RC)	October 2017	6, Better than competent	8, Standout	7, Performing well	6, Better than competent	7, A

This table continues on following page

Extended Table 1 (continued). CouncilMARK™ results as at June 2022

Participating Council	Report date	CouncilMARK Priority areas / 'pillars'				CouncilMARK Overall rating*
		Leading locally (LL)	Investing money Wisely (IMW)	Delivering What's Important (DWI)	Listening and Responding (L&R)	
Waimakariri District Council (SM/LP)	July 2020	7, Performing well	8, Standout	7, Performing well	7, Performing well	8, AA
	October 2017	8, Standout	7, Performing well	6, Better than competent	7, Performing well	8, AA
	Latest – former	-1	+1	+1	0	0
Wairoa District Council (SP/RU)	October 2017	3, Areas for improvement	4, Variable	5, Competent	5, Competent	3, CCC
Waitaki District Council (Small Metro and Provincial †)	December 2020	6, Better than competent	5, Competent	7, Performing well	7, Performing well	6, BBB
Whakatane District Council (SP/RU)	October 2017	4, Variable	5, Competent	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	5, BB
Whanganui District Council (SM/LP)	April 2020	4, Variable	5, Competent	6, Better than competent	5, Competent	5, BB

*Ratings: **C**, under-performing (none assigned); **CC**, More than two areas of improvement identified (none assigned); **CCC**, Two areas of improvement identified; **B**, One area of improvement identified; **BB**, Competent; **BBB**, Some areas of strength – overall competent; **A**, Some areas of strength and leadership; **AA**, Strong grades in most priority areas (i.e., 'pillars' of Fig. 4); **AAA**, Exemplary (none assigned).

† Types of council: Types of council: SP/RU, Small Provincial/Rural; SM/LP, Small Metro/Large Provincial; LM, Large Metro; RC, Regional Council

‡ Category not previously used, allocated to SM/LP for the purposes of **Table 1**.

Appendix 1: Discussion example #1 – Case studies in consultation⁶¹

The theme of this first set of Case Studies (Appendix 1) is CONSULTATION. Sometimes, a mayor champions a particular project, sometimes the project appears on a Council website and invites written submissions or attendance at a Council meeting where the matter is to be discussed. What style of consultation is best, and how can it ensure that those who are affected by the project are proactively engaged in the process?

Ratepayers and citizens are the most important stakeholders that councils have: they fund most of the Council's activities either through rates or fees and charges. Their views matter. The examples below describe instances where consultation appears to have been at least initially – and sometimes continually – inadequate or inappropriate.



Fig. A1-1. Artist's impressions of the beachside Gateway Centre, on the Kāpiti Coast

“Kāpiti Coast District councillors have voted to proceed with the construction of the new Gateway Centre on Paraparaumu beach, but some local businesses are warning of cost blow-outs and lack of community consultation. The centre was budgeted to cost around \$4.46 million, with the council securing \$2.3m from the Covid-19 Response and Recovery Fund. Work could start as soon as July this year....” (from: Hickman, B. 2021 (March 4). Kāpiti District Council approve \$4.5m 'gateway' centre, despite opposition. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/kapiti/124369044/kpiti-district-council-approve-45m-gateway-centre-despite-opposition>)

However, as the media commentary above later elaborates, not all the community is convinced that there has been adequate consultation, ultimately resulting in a review (below), being commissioned by the Council's Chief Executive, and prompting a recognition by the Mayor – a staunch advocate of the project – that “he accepted some elements of the criticism of the process.”

“A planned \$4.5 million “gateway” to Kāpiti Island will be subject to independent review, following criticism that the project was rushed through to take advantage of “shovel ready” Covid-19 funding.” (from: Hickman, B. 2021 (April 14). Kāpiti Gateway project process to undergo independent review. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/kapiti/124830323/kpiti-gateway-project-process-to-undergo-independent-review>)

A similar type of dispute was also reported in Napier

“Attempts to restore a war memorial in Napier have been described as an ongoing ‘failure of democracy’. In 2017, Napier City Council removed the memorial after renovating the War Memorial Centre by the town's sea front. The centre is used for conferences and events. This included an eternal flame and roll of honour. Some in the community reacted with fury once it was removed.

“Last night, Napier City Council unveiled concept drawings for a new memorial. War Memorial Recovery group spokesperson Alan Rhodes said the process had not had enough community input and had been a ‘failure of democracy’. Speaking at the meeting last night, he said: ‘In this meeting there, I don't see any idea or any

suggestion that the people of Napier are being consulted, they are not, they are being lectured and told'. 'When I looked up there at that design, for the wall, it's better than what's there now, I look at that - where's the question about what alternatives are there? What other possible designs are there?' " (Radio New Zealand. 2021(March 23). Napier City Council criticised for not consulting community over new war memorial. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/438975/napier-city-council-criticised-for-not-consulting-community-over-new-war-memorial>)

And – if there are Wellingtonian participants at the webinar – the saga of consultation over the controversial Island Bay cycleway is certain to emerge as a further example of flawed consultation.

"It must be the most controversial mile of roadway in Wellington – and nearly six years on from the creation of the Island Bay cycleway, the controversy continues to rumble on. The Wellington City Council has called for submissions by Sunday on its proposal to remove 80 to 100 parking spaces from The Parade between Dee and Reef Streets, its latest effort to improve safety. Now, once again, the South Coast community is riven apart by the proposal, with cycling advocates eager to move forward while local businesses are worried that the loss of parking spaces will compound their Covid-19 woes..." (from: Hickman, B. 2022 February 10. The Island Bay cycle way is up for discussion. Again. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/wellington/300510145/the-island-bay-cycle-way-is-up-for-discussion-again>)

These are just three recent examples of criticisms of councils' performance of their consultation with ratepayers and citizens. However, councils are sometimes criticised for too much consultation, particularly when it involves private consulting firms, as in the following example.

"The principal route to Wellington airport is a four lane road, currently without a safe crossing for pedestrians. The cheapest solution is a pedestrian crossing controlled by traffic lights – much cheaper than the tens of millions of dollars that an over-bridge would cost. The Dominion Post has carried opinion pieces for and against the proposal since 2018. In the latest twist to the saga, Let's Get Wellington Moving⁶² commissioned external consultants to undertake community consultations on the matter. Costing \$250,000 the consultants' report appears not to have reached a conclusion..." (from: Campbell, G. 2022 February 17. Almost \$250,000 spent on consultants for pedestrian crossing in Wellington. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/almost-250000-spent-on-consultants-for-pedestrian-crossing-in-wellington/YZDVVSPiA3NBGTJUQIF4VLPQ5E/>)

In addition to these examples, discussion is anticipated on the consultation processes associated with the development of councils' long-term plans, and with the annual updating of those plans.

Appendix 2: Discussion Example #2 – Social housing’ – a continuing responsibility for local government in New Zealand?⁶³

The theme of the second set of Case Studies (Appendix 2) is really WHAT ARE COUNCILS FOR? The examples are built around social housing, a current financial issue for many councils which built rental housing for pensioners at a time when its provision did not include any expectation of social services being provided as well, but is really the trigger for a wider discussion of what Council should be involved in: infrastructure such as roads, footpaths, parks, ‘three waters’ (although currently contentious) for sure – but social housing, sports arenas, festivals and fireworks....?

In the larger New Zealand cities, clearance of ‘slums’ – generally poorly maintained wooden dwellings crowded on small undivided sections (Fig. A2-1) – prompted the recognition of the need for better housing, particularly for the poor or elderly, and some flat-building by councils and the government resulted. The first flats owned by Wellington City Council and rented to pensioners and the elderly were opened in Berhampore in 1955 (Fig. A2-2).



Fig. A2-1 (Left): *Slums in Tui Street, Wellington, in 1941.*⁶⁴ Image: Alexander Turnbull Library: PAColl-6013.

Fig. A2-2 (Right): *“The first city council flats in Wellington built expressly for the use of elderly folk and pensioners have been opened by the Mayor, R. L. Macalister. The flats, comprising 32 units, are in Rintoul Street, Berhampore, and look out over the city on one side and to the sea south of Wellington on the other. Sixteen of the flats have already been allotted and the others will shortly be occupied by more tenants.”* New Zealand Fee Lance. 1955, October 15, p. 28. Image: Alexander Turnbull Library: PAColl-8163-57.

Wellington was by no means alone in recognizing the need for such accommodation; councils of all sizes were involved in such activities at least into the 1960s. Although built more to serve a social purpose rather than to provide an income stream for the council, they were sometimes associated with health clinics and other social services, but councils did not provide welfare or health services to either these or other citizens. While the provision of both housing and social services to tenants in them could be seen as promoting the social ‘well-being’ – one of four ‘well-beings’ (the others being economic, environmental and cultural) required by recent legislation relating to local government,⁶⁵ there has been surprisingly little debate on this matter, specifically whether councils should be in the housing ‘business’ at all, and whether providing social services for tenants should even be considered as a potential responsibility for local government.⁶⁶ In short, is the appropriate response of New Zealand local authorities to the housing crisis “Not our problem”?

“Porirua boasts some of the highest rents in the country, but the local council wants out of the social housing game, mounting another attempt to sell off the remaining 26 units on its books. The agency is asking ratepayers what it should do with the Moana Court Flats in Titahi Bay {**Fig.A2-3**} as part of its draft Long-term Plan (LTP) consultation currently under way. Boasting a capital value of \$3.3 million, the Wellington City Council-run complex was built in 1974 as a means of providing low-cost pensioner accommodation.

“Porirua Mayor Anita Baker (**Fig. A2-4**) felt the council should be concentrating on infrastructure, roading and fixing the harbour, rather than the provision of social housing which she said was not one of its “particular expertise”.



Fig. A2-3 (Left): The Moana Court flats in Porirua. These are typical of buildings developed as ‘pensioner housing’ dating from the 1960s in many New Zealand towns (e.g., Ratana and Bulls) and cities (e.g., Whanganui and Hamilton). Typically, councils owned, maintained, and rented out these flats, but provided limited social support to tenants (as an example, see Endnote 66).

Fig. A2-4 (Right): Porirua Mayor Anita Baker, pictured outside Kāinga Ora’s social housing development in Castor Crescent, believes her council should be focusing on infrastructure, roading and fixing the harbour, rather than providing social housing.

In fact, the Moana Flats in Porirua are managed by the Wellington City Council – which entered the market for what is now referred to as “social housing” many decades ago. In recent years many of the flats the Council manages have been renovated, refurbished or rebuilt.

Porirua City Council’s Chief Executive (Wendy Walker) does not provide definition of a “social landlord”. However, at least one Wellington city councillor “has raised concerns about supports available for residents in council housing after a woman was found dead” in her Council-owned flat. Councillor Fleur Fitzsimons, who holds the city’s housing portfolio, said, “The tragedy will, of course, lead to consideration about whether the support for tenants – and the efforts put into building a strong community within city housing – are adequate”.⁶⁷ Clearly Councillor Fitzsimons believes that the Wellington City Council should be doing more than merely collecting the rent; presumably ‘building a sense of community’ would be included were she asked to define the responsibilities of a social landlord.

Seasoned owner/developers of emergency or transitional housing seem to recognise that tenants in such housing need more than just accommodation: they do need ‘wraparound’ support in order to assist them to find employment and to assist them in becoming socially accepted and acceptable as the following piece indicates. The un-asked and, therefore, un-answered question is whether local authorities should be providing such services or should it remain a responsibility of central government. (adapted from: Te Ora, E. 2021, May 8. The slow - but necessary - transition away from emergency housing. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/pou-tiaki/our-truth/125061055/the-slow-but-necessary-transition-away-from-emergency-housing>)

As at April 2022, “Wellington City Council is trying to rescue its failing social housing arm, launching a public consultation over how it might keep the operation afloat. Council officers have homed in on two options: funding the service through rates and further debt, or establishing a community housing provider (CHP), which could then access an elusive rental subsidy [the income-related rental subsidy (IRRS)] for some tenants” [and thereby avoid ratepayers needing to subsidise social housing]. (from: Te Ora, E. 2022, April 22. Future of Wellington City

Council's troubled housing arm hangs in the balance. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/life-style/homed/housing-affordability/128403911/future-of-wellington-city-councils-troubled-housing-arm-hangs-in-the-balance>)

More generally, this discussion group is likely to 'stray' into other areas of services and infrastructure which have become problems for council generally because they have been inadequately maintained over decades exacerbated by councils' inability to raise the huge amounts of money required from rates or loans. The 'Three Waters Reform' is the current Government's recommended approach to one such problem.

Appendix 3: The role of experts. Discussion Example #3⁶⁸

The theme of the third set of Case Studies (Appendix 3) is THE ROLE OF EXPERTS. Of course, no one person can know everything and so, Councils often engage expert consultants. But, councillors – and, indeed Council staff – need sufficient knowledge of the issue to be able to ask questions of consultants – either directly or through feedback on the consultant's report – to ensure that the consultants' advice is applicable to the local authority to which it is proposed it be applied.

*Does "human superiority mean human privilege or human responsibility? Lordship or stewardship? It was the start of a long, still-unresolved debate about how far humans should exploit other creatures for our benefit." (from: Fernández-Armesto, F. 2019. *Out of Our Minds. What We Think and How We Came to Think It*. London: Oneworld, p. 130.*

The quotation above has clear implications for environmental management: if there is to be co-management of resources (or co-governance of the structures that manage them) who should undertake it, and how should the effectiveness of these arrangements be monitored and assured, for the benefit of all ratepayers and citizens?

"Lordship or stewardship"? The quotation could equally apply to council-controlled organisations (CCOs),⁶⁹ and public-private partnerships (PPPs), both of which generally include external 'experts' in the area of the resource or activity being controlled. In their governance role, elected councillors need to be assured that appropriate monitoring systems are in place to ensure that the organisation or partnership delivers what Council requires effectively and in a timely way, and that there are cost-effective benefits to citizens and ratepayers.

As a candidate for election, are you aware of co-management arrangements, CCOs, or PPPs in the local authority area in which you intend to stand? If they exist, are they delivering effectively. Are their structures and activities transparent, or are they veiled in 'commercial secrecy'? How closely does Council staff monitor such arrangements, and how often do councillors receive reports about them?⁷⁰

A good – if poorly performing – example of a Council-controlled organisation (CCO) is Wellington Water, an entity jointly owned by the city councils of Wellington, Porirua, Hutt, and Upper Hutt; the Greater Wellington Regional Council; and the South Wairarapa District Council. Councillors from each council sit on a 7-member 'Wellington Water Committee' "that provides overall leadership and direction for the company", a company which is also "governed by a [5-member] board of independent directors" to which a 6-person leadership team reports. Collectively, Wellington Water failed to fluoridate water supplies to the cities for several years and failed to notify the problem to the participating councils. An enquiry into the matter was initiated in April 2022.



Fig. A3-1 (Left): A Wellington Water fluoridation plant was shut down after an over-dosing incident.
Fig. A3-2 (Right): Another challenge for Wellington Water: ageing pipes and associated infrastructure for water, wastewater, and stormwater.

A media view of public-private partnerships is:

“... an agreement between the public sector and private business. Typically, it involves a government or council contracting out a project, which will be built and funded by the private sector. In return, the infrastructure is often maintained and operated by the private sector for 20 to 30 years after opening, allowing them to make a profit on their investment. There are more than a dozen variations on how a PPP may work. The design, financing, operation, maintenance and ownership of the infrastructure is all up for negotiation, but in all cases the private sector is in charge of construction. In almost every instance the private sector is asked to fill a need identified by government or council, but there are times when a private company proposes a piece of infrastructure, and the public sector buys into it

“What are the benefits of a PPP?

“According to a 2006 paper released by the Treasury, there are a number of possible benefits of a PPP project. Because the private sector is invested in the long-term viability of a project, they often better estimate the whole of life costs of construction and operation. Businesses are seeking to make a profit from their investment in the infrastructure, and so the more it’s open after completion, and the less it needs maintenance, the better. PPPs can lead to higher quality infrastructure which lasts longer and needs less maintenance as a result. “The whole-of-life approach and the contractual obligations around maintenance ensure that it is fully maintained throughout its life,” the Treasury paper said. “This is not always the case under the direct management of a public agency, where maintenance needs are sometimes subordinated to other priorities.” Other advantages include the financing being off the books of the public sector, and the possibility of additional capital when private finance is involved. This can be particularly useful in poorer nations.

“What are the disadvantages?

“According to the Treasury paper, the tendering and negotiation process is far more complicated than normal procurement contracts. “This is principally because of the need to anticipate all possible contingencies that could arise in such long-term contractual relationships.” Despite an effort to foresee any possible issues that could arise, it is “almost inevitable” issues will arise that could not be foreseen. For example, a pandemic. Unforeseen issues lead to contract renegotiation, and while provisions may be in place setting out how variations should be put in place, sometimes the public sector can end up paying a heavy price through renegotiations. “The cost of such changes is difficult to factor into the original project evaluation, since by definition it is unanticipated.” The paper also found performance enforcement was an issue with a long-term PPP project. In the case of a road build, if a contract lasts only five years private companies are eager to meet their targets in order to maintain their relationship with Waka Kotahi and the government. Poor performance can affect a company’s reputation, and their ability to sign future contracts. Another risk identified by the Treasury paper was the political acceptability of a project. Given the length of time the contract runs for, there are risks a private sector company could go bankrupt while building the infrastructure, leaving the government with a half-built project other companies may be resistant to take over. On the other side, the private sector may end up making more money than expected out of an agreement, and that could cause political pressure for the government.

“In summary, the Treasury paper had some reservations about PPPs. ‘The more complete transfer of risk that is possible under a PPP, results in better project evaluation and stronger incentives to innovate and minimise whole of life costs,’ it said. ‘But these advantages must be balanced against the large contract negotiation costs, the inflexibilities of a long-term contract, and the reduced competitive pressures on performance after the contract has been entered into.’”

This particular commentary was provided in the context of the development of the Transmission Gully motorway north of Wellington City, built under a PPP in which the Government was the public partner. This, it was appropriate that the commentator should conclude by asking, “How does Transmission Gully stack up?”



Fig. A3-3. Transmission Gully motorway north of Wellington

“At this point, poorly....” (From: Strang, B. 2022, February 19. What is a public-private partnership, and when will we see Transmission Gully open? (<https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/wellington/127794437/what-is-a-public-private-partnership-and-when-will-we-see-transmission-gully-open>)

Even less charitable is the extract below from an earlier story:

“Transport Minister Michael Wood says Transmission Gully’s public-private partnership model was a mistake. It comes after Waka Kotahi NZ Transport Agency confirmed on Monday the road would not be open in time for Christmas – the fifth time in two years it has missed an opening day deadline Just when it will be open is still unclear. ‘Transmission Gully is a botched National Party PPP and we’re experiencing the costs of that now,’ Wood said on Tuesday.” (From: McManus, Joel; Manch, T. 2021 Dec 15. Transmission Gully public-private partnership contract was wrong call, Transport Minister says. (<https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/wellington/127274853/transmission-gully-public-private-partnership-contract-was-wrong-call-transport-minister-says?rm=a>)

Endnotes

¹ Local Government act 2002 (and subsequent amendments). Schedule 2 lists all the local authorities to which the Act applies

² Professor A. C. Grayling is a British philosopher and author. He was born in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and spent most of his childhood there and in Nyasaland (now Malawi). In 2011 he founded and became the first Master of New College of the Humanities, an independent college in London. Until June 2011, he was Professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck, University of London, where he taught from 1991. He is also a supernumerary fellow of St Anne’s College, Oxford where he formerly taught.

³ Grayling, A.C. 2018. *Democracy and its Crisis*. London: Oneworld, p. 140.

⁴ Grayling, *op. cit.*, p. 154-155.

⁵ The classic New Zealand example is fluoridation of public water supplies. The benefits to dental health of adding fluoride to water was first demonstrated by a comparative study of Hastings (which had fluoride added to its water supply) and Napier (which had not) in the mid-1950s (Taylor, D. 1955. Fluoridation comes to Hastings. *New Zealand Medical Journal* 54 (299), pp. 23-25; *Appendices to the House of Representatives*. 1953.

H-31, p. 54.). Subsequent studies reinforced those conclusions (e.g., de Liefde. B. 1998. The decline of caries in New Zealand over the past 40 years. *New Zealand Dental Journal* 94, pp. 109-113), but sceptics remained (e.g., Colquhoun, J.; Mann, R. 1986. Hastings (New Zealand) fluoridation experiment: science or swindle? *Ecologist* 16, pp. 243-248; Wrapson, J. 2005. Artificial fluoridation of public water supplies in New Zealand: 'magic bullet', 'rat poison' or Communist plot? *Health and History* 7 (2), pp. 17-29). With the Royal Society of New Zealand and the Chief Science Advisor firmly 'on-board' with fluoridation (Gluckman, P.; Skegg, D. 2014. *Health effects of water fluoridation: A review of the scientific evidence*. Royal Society of New Zealand and the Office of the Prime Minister's Chief Science Advisor), a firm rebuttal of much of the counter-'evidence' (Broadbent, J.M.; Wills, R.; McMillan, J.; Drummond, B.K.; Whyman, R. 2015, Evaluation of evidence behind recent claims against community water fluoridation in New Zealand. *Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand* 45 (3), pp. 161-178), and the reluctance of Christchurch Council to fluoridate its water despite children having 24% higher caries incidence than comparable cities probably all contributed to the eventual decision in March 2021 to remove decision-making on this matter from local authorities and transfer responsibility to the Director-General of Health.

⁶ 'Part 6: A refocus on well-being'. *Insights into local government 2019*. Office of the Auditor General, <https://oag.parliament.nz/2020/local-govt/part6.htm>


⁷ 'Part 5: Councils' activity on climate change'. *Insights into local government 2019*. Office of the Auditor General, <https://oag.parliament.nz/2020/local-govt/part5.htm>

⁸ Adapting to climate change' 2019. In *Local government funding and financing. Final report*. Wellington: New Zealand Productivity Commission, pp. 223-256.

⁹ *Local Government Act 2002, Version as at 15 November 2021* (<https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0084/latest/DLM170873.html>)

¹⁰ Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ). 2017. *Local Government Survey 2017*. <https://www.lgnz.co.nz/our-work/publication/new-zealand-local-government-survey-2017>

¹¹ Hodder, P. 2019. Measuring the effectiveness of New Zealand's local government. *Policy Quarterly* 15 (9), pp 75-83 – shows the data presented in this document as **Table 3**, and in the diagram below (**Fig. EN11**).



¹² An example is Wellington Water, an entity jointly owned by the city councils of Wellington, Porirua, Hutt, and Upper Hutt; the Greater Wellington Regional Council; and the South Wairarapa District Council. Councillors from each council sit on a 7-member 'Wellington Water Committee' "that provides overall leadership and direction for the company", a company which is also "governed by a [5-member] board of independent directors" to which a 6-person leadership team reports. Collectively, Wellington Water failed to fluoridate water supplies to the cities for several years and failed to notify the problem to the participating councils. An enquiry into the matter was initiated in April 2022 (<https://www.wellingtonwater.co.nz/about-us/news/scope-and-terms-of-reference-set-for-wellington-water-fluoridation-inquiry/>)

¹³ An example of this is local government in London for the period 1970-1980, of which it has been written: "Though constitutional responsibility lay with those voted for by the public, in truth the elected were taking advice from the unelected, a coalition of architects, planners and contractors. To criticise the politicians was akin to blaming a patient for obeying doctor's orders." These 'doctors' "showed no humility, only arrogance.

Trained in the early post-war years, they treated the metropolis [London] as their professional foible and source of gain, leading gullible politicians of the left and right up an ideological garden to a false utopia." (From: Jenkins, S. 2019. *A short history of London. The creation of a world capital*. Penguin, pp. 285-286). Among other things, this short quotation highlights the risks of "commercially sensitive" dealing, an activity that is far too common in NZ local government (e.g., the involvement of Hamilton City Council in effectively subsidising hotel development by Tainui; Wellington City Council's 'negotiations' with film-maker Peter Jackson about a proposed film museum / conference centre), as well as the dangers of not getting truly independent advice and reviewing that advice for its applicability to the local situation (e.g., Wellington Regional Council's contract for investigating city bus services, ultimately described by the local news media as a 'busastrophe'). Concern about this type of issue is returned to later in this document.

¹⁴ Quoted from: Rogers, M. Preface. In Needham, C.; Mangan, C. 2014. *The 21st Century Public Servant*. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 23 pp.

(<https://21stcenturypublicservant.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/21-century-report-281014.pdf>)

¹⁵ A similar diagram developed for staff (<https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/public-service-academy/about/twentyfirst-century-ps.aspx>) is shown below (Fig. EN15).



Fig. EN15. 'The 21st Century Public Servant'

¹⁶ Desmarais, F. 2021, March 26. The black hole of transparency: Secret council workshops under the microscope. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/rotorua-daily-post/news/the-black-hole-of-transparency-secret-council-workshops-under-the-microscope/SKQEBQOWFQ3MT7RCLYW4JP2OPE/>. The article noted that of 937 'workshops' collectively conducted by councils during the period 2018-2020, only 21% were open to the public. The table below (Table EN16) shows the enormous range of 'open-ness' of council deliberations.

Table EN16. Variation between councils of 'workshops' for councillors that were open to the public, 2018-2020

Council	Number of workshops	Workshops open to public	
		No.	%
Hamilton City Council	[not stated]	[not stated]	100%
Tauranga City Council	62	55	89%
Taupo District Council	149	105	70%
Hutt City Council	99	69	70%
Waipa District Council	199	108	54%
Bay of Plenty Regional Council	39	2	5%
Rotorua Lakes District Council	37	0	0%
Western Bay of Plenty District Council	90	0	0%


¹⁷ The preparation of Long-term Plans and their annual updating is a legislative requirement under Clause 93 of the Local Government Act (<https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0084/latest/whole.html>)

¹⁸ Hodder 2019, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

¹⁹ Reid, M. 2019. Examining the case for decentralization. *Policy Quarterly* 15 (2), pp. 3-9.

²⁰ James, C. 2019. Where are the locals? *Policy Quarterly* 15 (2), pp. 10-12. Rather more optimistic views are provided by McKinlay, P. 2019. Localism: Let's do this. *Policy Quarterly* 15 (2), pp. 38-43; and Courtney, M. A focus on the how not the who: Localism in Aotearoa through a community-led lens. *Policy Quarterly* 15 (2), pp. 33-37.

²¹ The variation of submissions (as percent of population) with Listening and Responding (L&R) score in CouncilMARK (**Fig. EN21** below) shows a modestly positive trend for district councils, but a very weakly negative trend for city councils (the correlation coefficient for linear regression is +0.5 for district councils, and -0.04 for city councils); for all participating councils the trend is weakly positive, with a correlation coefficient for linear regression of 0.22.



²² These include concerns expressed in Kapiti (Hickman, B. 2021, March 4. Kāpiti District Council approve \$4.5m 'gateway' centre, despite opposition. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/kapiti/124369044/kpiti-district-council-approve-45m-gateway-centre-despite-opposition>) and Napier (Radio New Zealand. 2021, March 23. Napier City Council criticised for not consulting community over new war memorial. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/438975/napier-city-council-criticised-for-not-consulting-community-over-new-war-memorial>). These examples (see **Appendix 1**) need to be balanced with successful activities such as that in Gisborne District Council's *What's the future Tarawhiti?* campaign which "as well as the eye-catching WTF slogan ... included colourful branding, a roadshow of 35 events including Hui a Iwi at local marae, an interactive website, a branded Kombi van, provocative and colourful newspaper advertising and bilingual radio advertising, digital advertising and social media." Judges said "This project showed innovative, edgy engagement for consultation of the Council's Long Term Plan reaching new community segments. The project widened the participation from different communities and demographics, including youth and Māori, resulting in increased face to face engagement by 700 per cent." <https://www.lgnz.co.nz/news-and-media/2018-media-releases/gisbornes-wtf-tairawhiti-campaign-a-finalist-in-lgnz-excellence-awards/>

²³ Strang, B. 2022, February 19. What is a public-private partnership, and when will we see Transmission Gully open? <https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/wellington/127794437/what-is-a-public-private-partnership-and-when-will-we-see-transmission-gully-open>

²⁴ Statistics New Zealand. 2013. Infographic. New Zealand as a Village of 100 People. <https://www.stats.govt.nz/infographics/new-zealand-as-a-village-of-100-people>

²⁵ Lasthuizen, K. 2018. *Ethical Leadership: Opportunities and Challenges for Aotearoa New Zealand*. Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington – Victoria Business School, p. 10.

²⁶ Chapple, S.; Prickett, K. 2019. *Who Do We Trust in New Zealand? 2016 to 2019*. Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington – Institute for Governance and Policy Studies, p. 10.

²⁷ Council controlled organisations ; see Local Government Act 3002, clause 6. <https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0084/latest/DLM171482.html>

²⁸ As an example, Māori with ancestral connection to particular land and its resources may interpret that connection as carrying a responsibility for managing – or co-managing– that land and its resources, sometimes affirming a heritage of virtuous environmental stewardship (e.g., Taiuru, K. 2019. Ngāi Tahu perspectives on freshwater. *Policy Quarterly* 15 (3), pp. 41-44). In fact, settler communities generally adapt and exploit their new environment to meet their wants and needs (Dartnell, L. 2018. *Origins: How the Earth Made Us*. London: Bodley Head), and Māori do not appear to be an exception. For example, shortly after the arrival of Ngāi Tahu in Canterbury, they set fire to the Canterbury Plains “to clear the land for cultivation” and “to flush out moa from dense forest and scrub”, most likely being unaware of the very different consequences for burning lush tropical forests in their Pacific homeland compared with dry grassland (Berentson, Q. 2012. *Moa: The Life and Death of New Zealand’s Legendary Bird*. Nelson: Craig Potton, pp. 262-264). The scientific legacy of the “fires of Tamatea” is the charcoal layers and remains of micro-organisms in the sediments of the region’s lakes (Wilmhurst, T. 2010. High-precision radiocarbon dating shows recent and rapid initial human colonization of East Polynesia. *Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand* 48, pp. 67-162; Anderson, A. 2016. The making of the Māori middle ages [J.D. Stout Lecture, 2016]. *Journal of New Zealand Studies* NS23, pp. 2-18), while the environmental legacy includes the extinction of the moa. That said, rather less intrusive environmental changes practised by Māori migrants to New Zealand included the modification of soils to enhance the growing of kūmara (e.g., Gumbley, W.J. 2021. *The Waikato Horticultural Complex: An Archaeological Reconstruction of a Polynesian Horticultural System*. PhD Thesis, Australian National University, Canberra; Mitchell, H.; Mitchell, J. 2020. Ahumāra - Māori horticulture. <http://www.theprow.org.nz/maori/maori-horticultural-skills-and-their-soils/#.Yk4YsShBybg>; McNab, J.W. 1969. Sweet potatoes and Maori terraces in the Wellington area. *The Journal of the Polynesian Society* 78 (1), pp. 83-111.

²⁹ An early collaborative project was the development of the Ohaaki geothermal power station. The bland statement about the power station, viz., “New Zealand’s second major geothermal power station arose out of the 1960s discovery of a new [geothermal] field around 25 kilometres northeast of Wairakei. Nothing was done to exploit it, however, until the late 1970s, when land for a station was leased from Ngati Tahu” (Wright, M. 2009. *Big Ideas. 100 Wonders of New Zealand Engineering*. Auckland: Random House, p. 213) says nothing about the ultimately successful negotiations between the Crown and Ngati Tahu for the latter to retain the use of the geothermal resource for the local marae and the preservation of natural hot pools and other features of the landscape. Ohaaki was the first of several projects exploiting geothermal energy in the central North Island that have involved collaboration between the Crown and Māori.

³⁰ Lake Horowhenua is another example. In May 2021, a collaboration between Muaūpoko, Lake Horowhenua Trust (representing the owners of the lake), Ngāti Raukawa ki te Tonga, Horizons Regional Council, Horowhenua District Council, dairy farmers, horticulturalists and the wider Lake Horowhenua community will convert a 142-ha dairy farm (purchased for \$6,70,000) into a large wetland and indigenous vegetation area, with huge benefits for the water quality of Lake Horowhenua, redressing in very small measure the loss of 90% of New Zealand’s wetlands. The total cost of the project is \$12.5 million.

<https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/major-step-restoration-lake-horowhenua> . The lake had long been recognised as an environmental concern (e.g., Gibbs, M. 2011. *Lake Horowhenua Review. Assessment of Opportunities to Address Water Quality Issues in Lake Horowhenua*. Report prepared for Horizons Regional Council. Hamilton: NIWA, 113 pp; and had been the subject of an extensive research project undertaken from a Māori perspective: Hamer, P. 2015. *A Tangled Skein. Lake Horowhenua, Muaūpoko, and the Crown, 1898-2000*. A report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal for the Porirua ki Manawatū inquiry (Wai 2200).

³¹ Vance, A. 2022, April 6. Co-governance - a phrase that may challenge our notions of citizenship, law, even power. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/128239966/cogovernance--a-phrase-that-may-challenge-our-notions-of-citizenship-law-even-power>

³² *Ārewa ake te Kaupapa Raising the platform*. 2021, September. Interim Report of Review into the Future of Local Government. https://www.futureforlocalgovernment.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/DIA_16724_Te-Arotake-Future-of-Local-Government-Interim-report_22.pdf

³³ Bargh, M. 2020. Challenges on the path to Treaty-based Local Government relationships. *Kōtuitui, New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online* 16, pp. 70-85.

³⁴ At the University of Notre Dame, Professor Felipe Fernández-Armesto’s current research projects are in the history of language and of cultural organisms; his current or recent undergraduate classes are on global environmental history, early colonial Native Mesoamerican source materials, and the history of wisdom; while he supervises graduate study across a wide field, mainly in the early modern history of colonial societies.

³⁵ Fernández-Armesto. 2020, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-258.

³⁶ *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Declaration Plan in Aotearoa*. <https://www.tpk.govt.nz/docs/tpk-undrip-a5book-en-feb2022.pdf> . The Declaration’s key themes are: self-

determination; equality and non-discrimination; participation in government; social, cultural, and economic wellbeing; and land, territories, and resources (in particular, “the right to own and control the lands they possess, as well as the right to compensation for the taking of their lands. States shall provide legal recognition of their lands through fair and open processes”).

³⁷ Rotorua District Council (Representation Arrangements) Bill. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/sc/make-a-submission/document/53SCMA_SCF_BILL_121327/rotorua-district-council-representation-arrangements

³⁸ Fernández-Armesto. 2020 (*op. cit.*, p. 258) continues, “It is a dangerous idea because equality enforced at the expense of liberty can be tyrannous”. At the very least, it can be problematic: an example is provided by the New Zealand Attorney General’s tentative view that Rotorua council representation bill cannot be “justified” on the grounds, saying that “The bill creates a disparity in the number of people represented by each ward council member. [It] would make the number of council members for the Māori ward disproportionately higher than the number of council members for the general ward in comparison to their respective populations.’ This meant those on the general, non-Māori roll were disadvantaged and discriminated against, as they could not change their roll.” (from Smith, L. 2022 April 22. Rotorua council representation bill 'cannot be justified' - Attorney-General. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/rotorua-daily-post/news/rotorua-council-representation-bill-cannot-be-justified-attorney-general/FISDTUCJOZHW7LKQMWEF2IIENE/>)

³⁹ Salmond, Dame A. 2022, May 3. Te Tiriti and democracy: The principle of equal representation, who asserts that, person.” <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/ideasroom/te-tiriti-and-democracy-part-5>

⁴⁰ Fernández-Armesto, F. 2020, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

⁴¹ Fernández-Armesto (2020, *op. cit.*, pp. 396, 398) observes, “... in a multi-civilizational world composed of multicultural societies, shaped by massive migrations, and intense exchange of culture, enmity is increasingly unaffordable. We need an idea that will yield peace and generate co-operation. We need pluralism ... It is the only true uniform interest that all the world’s peoples have in common. Paradoxically, perhaps pluralism is the one doctrine that can unite us.”

⁴² Review into the Future for Local Government Newsletter, April 2022.

<https://outlook.office.com/mail/inbox/id/AAQkADVjZGI4YjJlLTM1MDUtNDM4ZC05MjJlLdJyZjZlZTM2YzlkYgAQAGfbz3vaug5LmpBhLQjSmWk%3D>

⁴³ Pahia Turia, Chair Ngā Wairiki, Ngāti Apa, Whanganui, Ngā Rauru and Ngāti Tuwharetoa. Pahia has been involved in Iwi governance for over 25 years and is currently the chair of Te Rūnanga o Ngā Wairiki – Ngāti Apa. During his time in this role, he was responsible for negotiating through their difficult coastline agreement, and was also involved in Treaty Settlement negotiations resulting in significant freshwater fisheries for his people. Pahia is no stranger to the fisheries industry through both his experience as a negotiator and his role at Te Rūnanga, which trains its members in all aspects of the marine and freshwater environment. Pahia is passionate about increasing the knowledge and management of the sustainable utilisation of customary fishing. Pahia has held the Paepae at Whangaehu Marae since he was just 14 years of age, and has led numerous projects in the advancement of health, housing, youth development, education and suicide prevention.

⁴⁴ Courtney, M. 2019. A focus on the how not the who. Localism in Aotearoa through a community-led lens. *Policy Quarterly* 15 (2), pp. 33-37. She has been active in the organization *Inspiring Communities* since its inception in 2006; a subsequent podcast about her activities is available at:

<https://www.businesslab.co.nz/beyond-consultation-podcast/27>

⁴⁵ Inspiring Communities: Ka tautoko, ka whakatipu te whakawhanake ā-hapori o Aotearoa. | Supporting and growing Community-Led Development practices and outcomes across Aotearoa New Zealand (<https://inspiringcommunities.org.nz/>).

⁴⁶ Government inquiry into Havelock North drinking water. 2017. Report of the Havelock North Drinking Water Inquiry. Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs. <https://www.dia.govt.nz/Government-inquiry-into-Havelock-North-Drinking-Water>

⁴⁷ Tyson, J.; Eppel, E. 2016. The Canterbury Water Management Strategy” ‘smart’ management of collaborative processes. ANZSOG [Australia and New Zealand School of Government] Case Program 2016-186.1 and 186.2. www.anzsog.edu.au/resource-library/case-library/canterbury-water-management-strategy-the-smart-management-of-collaborative-processes

⁴⁸ Lee. J. 2018, March 23. Environment Canterbury has given an infringement notice to itself for polluting a stream. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/102487111/environment-canterbury-has-given-an-infringement-notice-to-itself-for-polluting-a-stream>

⁴⁹ LEK Consulting 2018. Wellington City and Hutt Valley Bus Network Implementation Review. Sydney: LEK Consulting Australia Pty Ltd. <https://www.metlink.org.nz/assets/Uploads/Implementat-Review3.pdf>

⁵⁰ Yeoman, S. 2019, March 26. Government report: Bella Vista development in Tauranga a 'significant failure' by council. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/bay-of-plenty-times/news/government-report-bella-vista-development-in-tauranga-a-significant-failure-by-council/AC7YNB2VWRJARRXQIO7UTL2L4Y/>

⁵¹ Fallon, V. 2021, February 13. Porirua council's 24 townhouses sit empty for more than a year, amid housing crisis. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/property/124224593/porirua-councils-24-townhouses-sit-empty-for-more-than-a-year-amid-housing-crisis>

⁵² Hunt, T. 2020, November 11. The complicated saga of Shelly Bay, explained. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/wellington/123351769/the-complicated-saga-of-shelly-bay-explained>

⁵³ Three Waters Reform. <https://www.dia.govt.nz/Three-Waters-Reform-Programme> . A 'quick overview' is provided at: [https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Three-waters-reform-programme-2022/\\$file/Three-Waters-Reform-boiled-down-1.pdf](https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Three-waters-reform-programme-2022/$file/Three-Waters-Reform-boiled-down-1.pdf) . The new entities, established as a consequence of these reforms are anticipated as being implemented in 2024, i.e., during the term of councils elected in 2022. The Powerpoint slides in the 'boiled down' document entitled 'What is outside the scope of the Government's "Three Waters Reforms"' and 'Some common questions' may be particularly relevant to candidates campaigning for election to council in 2022.

⁵⁴ The broad intention of the reforms is signalled in *New Directions for Resource Management in New Zealand*. 2020, July 1. Report of the Resource Management Review Panel: Summary and Key Recommendations. <https://environment.govt.nz/assets/Publications/Files/rm-panel-review-report-summary.pdf> . Three pieces of legislation are envisaged to replace the Resource Management Act: (1), the 'Natural and Built Environments Act', through which "central government's proposed new National Planning Framework will provide a set of mandatory national policies and standards on specified aspects of the new system. These will include natural environmental limits, outcomes and targets", and for which, as at April 2022, an exposure draft is available at: <https://environment.govt.nz/publications/natural-and-built-environments-bill-parliamentary-paper-on-the-exposure-draft/>; (2), The 'Strategic Planning Act', which provides a strategic and long-term approach to plan for using land and the coastal marine area', in which "regional strategies will enable more efficient land and development markets to improve housing supply, affordability and choice, and climate change mitigation and adaptation"; and (3), the 'Climate Adaptation Act', which "will support New Zealand's response to the effects of climate change [and] will address the complex legal and technical issues associated with managed retreat and funding and financing adaptation".

⁵⁵ An annual award scheme organized through Local Government New Zealand with sponsors in categories, viz., best practice in governance, leadership and strategy; best practice in service delivery and asset management; community engagement; best practice contribution to local economic development; environmental impact; and best creative place. As an example, the activities recognised in the 2018 awards ranged "from a world-leading programme to locate library services in a DHB health hub, to innovative economic, environmental and arts strategies, finalists in the 2018 Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ) EXCELLENCE Awards showcase a wide range of outstanding council leadership initiatives". <https://www.lgnz.co.nz/news-and-media/2018-media-releases/innovative-projects-feature-in-local-government-excellence-awards/>

For more examples of this type of activity, see: About the Awards <https://taituara.org.nz/excellence-awards>
The Supreme Award winner, Far North District Council

https://taituara.org.nz/Story?Action=View&Story_id=411 watch the video

The Buddle Findlay Award for Māori-Council Partnerships

https://taituara.org.nz/Story?Action=View&Story_id=397 watch the video

Highly Commended for GHD Award for Environmental Leadership

https://taituara.org.nz/Story?Action=View&Story_id=400 watch the video

⁵⁶ A cynical view is expressed in: Armstrong, D. 2022, April 5. We should rename more Wellington streets to show our outrage. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/opinion/128262077/we-should-rename-more-wellington-streets-to-show-our-outrage> Armstrong concludes his piece by saying, "Given the new convention centre [in Wellington] is opening soon we could rename Cable Street Foster's Folly. Trouble is, our mayor inherited the costly behemoth, and is only one of many councillors who have supported it. I suspect Vanity Fairway, White Elephant Road or Overbudget Street would be more appropriate, although that last one might be being saved for Civic Square when the old town hall finally reopens."

⁵⁷ Devlin, C. 2016, August 12. New \$150m design for Wellington Movie Museum and Convention Centre. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/83124112/new-150m-design-for-wellington-movie-museum-and-convention-centre>

⁵⁸ Williams, K. 2021, January 30. Porirua Mayor attributes Anzac Day confusion to 'total misunderstanding'. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/porirua/124078457/porirua-mayor-attributes-anzac-day-confusion-to-total-misunderstanding>

⁵⁹ Councils accused of obstructing efforts to restore war graves. 2022, April 21. "Local councils often stand in the way of young people trying to keep the nation's war graves in pristine condition, a volunteer says. ... Group founder Simon Strombom said it had been working with the Student Volunteer Army and there would be teams at 30 sites around the country doing a general tidy-up of the war graves and also remembering those who died and their families. "Keeping the generations alive with the spirit of Anzac." Strombom said there had been a mixed response from councils to their work, with those in larger centres making their work next to impossible. "It seems to be the larger the council, the more process and procedure they make us jump through. Some of them make us jump through stuff that virtually destroys volunteerism - they make it absolutely impossible." (from Radio New Zealand. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/465669/councils-accused-of-obstructing-efforts-to-restore-war-graves>)

⁶⁰ Lasthuizen, K. 2018, June 28. *Leading for integrity: Opportunities and challenges for ethical leadership*. Inaugural Lecture, Victoria University of Wellington.

⁶¹ Appendix 1 endnotes follow

⁶² The 'Let's Get Wellington Moving' (LGWM) organisation aims "to develop a transport system for the future, we bring together local government, transport expertise and mana whenua perspectives', by working with Wellington City Council, Greater Wellington Regional Council, and Waka Kotahi | NZ Transport Agency. .Its focus Our focus is the area from Ngauranga Gorge to Miramar including the Wellington Urban Motorway, access to the port, and connections to the central city, Wellington Hospital, and the airport. It includes all the ways we get to and around our city, and how the city develops alongside its transport system. A review of LGWM in February 2021 "... found the plan was at risk of failing to deliver, had a detrimental culture and was inadequately resourced", and that there was a "strategic leadership vacuum." There has been little evidence of change in the agency since then.

⁶³ Appendix 2 endnotes follow

⁶⁴ Such neighbourhoods were highlighted by Orchiston, B.E. and Department of Housing Construction. 1937-1941. *Photographs of substandard housing and state housing in cities and small towns throughout New Zealand*. Wellington: Alexander Turnbull Library: PAColl-6013. A more recent analysis of the early subdivision and private tenanting of this area of Wellington is: Hodder, C. 2015. "A very slummy area' – *History and houses of Tui Street*. Wellington: HodderBalog.

⁶⁵ Local Government (Community Well-being) Amendment Bill 2018. See also: Grimes, A. 2019. Well-being at the local level. *Policy Quarterly* 15 (2), 44-49.

⁶⁶ Whanganui District Council avoids this issue by declaring on its website "Tenant Well-being: Age Concern is available to provide specialist advice, support and to facilitate connection to other service providers. This service is free to all tenants." <https://www.whanganui.govt.nz/Community-Culture/Housing>.

⁶⁷ George, D.; Te Ora, E. 2021, April 25. City councillor raises concerns about supports in council housing after woman found dead. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/300285665/city-councillor-raises-concerns-about-supports-in-council-housing-after-woman-found-dead>.

⁶⁸ Appendix 3 endnotes follow

⁶⁹ The benefits and disadvantages of Council-Controlled Organisations (CCOs) are concisely summarised by the Office of the Auditor General in 2015 as shown in **Table EN69**

Table EN69. Benefits and risks of Council Controlled Organisations (CCOs)*

Benefits	Risks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● improved commercial focus – that is, operating a company with a professional board of directors with the objective of achieving greater operating efficiency; ● ring-fencing financial risk, by using an incorporated structure to insulate a local authority from financial liability for an activity or venture involving other parties (such as a joint venture); ● empowering local communities – that is, creating a trust with a set budget funded by a local authority but managed by members of the community for a specific purpose such as maintaining a community centre; and <p>tax-effectiveness – local authorities can derive tax credits from commercial subsidiaries that pay dividends.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the local authority's lack of direct accountability to the community for the services the CCO delivers; ● tensions between the objectives of pursuing profit and delivering community outcomes; ● additional ongoing costs – the costs incurred by the local authority in monitoring the performance of the CCO, and the CCO's own costs, can increase overall service delivery costs; and ● reduced ability to manage risk – arm's-length delivery can make managing risks to the reputation of the local authority more difficult.

*<https://oag.parliament.nz/2015/cco-governance/part3.htm>

⁷⁰ Among its many findings, the NZ Productivity Commission’s 2019 report (*Local Government Funding and Financing*) found (Finding 5.4, p. 303): “Successive legislative reforms aimed at increasing the transparency of council performance through prescriptive reporting requirements have been counterproductive. The performance reporting framework of local government requires fundamental review, with a mind to significantly simplifying the required disclosures, and improving their overall coherence and fitness for purpose”, leading to a recommendation (Recommendation 5.4, p. 305) “The performance reporting framework of local government (including the financial disclosures, Funding Impact Statement and performance measures) should undergo a fundamental, first principles review.”